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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY,
Appellant/Petitioner,
Case No. 20060201
v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee/Respondent.

APPELLEE'S BRIEF
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Lafferty appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his aggravated murder
conviction and resulting death sentence. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (West 2004).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did the post-conviction court correctly grant summary judgment on the claims that
Lafferty could have, but did not raise on direct appeal?
2. Did the post-conviction court correctly reject Lafferty's request to set aside his
criminal conviction and death sentence because his post-conviction counsel could not or did
not comply with the ABA Guidelines for prosecuting a death-penalty, post-conviction case?
3. Did the post-conviction court correctly deny post-conviction relief for newly

discovered "mere impeachment" evidence that Lafferty never presented to the postconviction court?
4. Did the post-conviction court correctly grant summary judgment on Lafferty's
ineffective-assistance claims?
5. Did the post-conviction court correctly grant summary judgment on Lafferty's
conflict-of-interest claim where Lafferty proffered no evidence that his trial counsel had to
and actually did make choices that subverted Lafferty's interests for someone else's benefit?
The post-conviction court granted summary judgment. This Court reviews summary
judgments for correctness, viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Dowling v. Bullen, 94 P.3d 915,2004 UT 50 *|7.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The texts of Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-104 through 106, and 109; Utah R. Civ. P.
65C; and Utah Admin. R. 25-14 are in addendum A.
CASE STATEMENT
Lafferty and his brother Dan murdered their sister-in-law Brenda Lafferty and her
fifteen-month-old daughter, Erica. Lafferty master-minded the murders.
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Lafferty claimed to some of his brothers and to his associates that he received a
"removal revelation." Lafferty claimed that God ordered the "removal" of his brother
Allen's wife, Brenda; their fifteen-month-old daughter, Erica; Richard Stowe; and Chloe

2

Low. State v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342, 2001 UT 19 f 8, cert. ^ / W 5 534 U.S. 1018 (2001).
Lafferty believed that all four in some way either had helped his ex-wife, Diana, obtain a
divorce or had played a part in his excommunication from the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints ("LDS Church"). Id. at f 9.1
Lafferty claimed that he received another revelation on March 13,1984, commanding
that he and his religious group, the School of the Prophets, "consecrate" an "instrument" for
removing the four named persons. Only Dan and Lafferty agreed. The other School of the
Prophets members felt that this and the "removal revelation" were not of God and
disassociated themselves from the revelations.2 Lafferty and Dan continued in their belief
that the revelations needed to be fulfilled. Id. at f 10.
On the morning of July 24,1984, Lafferty, Dan, and their friends Charles Carnes and
Ricky Knapp planned to go to Salt Lake City for the day. On their way, they stopped at Allen
and Brenda's apartment. When no one answered the door, they continued to Salt Lake.

!

Lafferty thought that Brenda had encouraged Diana to divorce him. On several
occasions before the removal revelation, Lafferty called Brenda a "bitch." Lafferty told
Allen that Brenda "had better stop talking to Diana," that "people weren't safe in
meddling in his affairs anymore," and that "he felt justified in taking action of some sort
against people who crossed him." After the "removal revelation," Lafferty explained that
fifteen-month-old Erica needed to be removed because "she would grow up to be a bitch
just like her mother." Id. at ^ 9 and n.5
Chloe Low, Diana's friend, helped and encouraged Diana to leave Lafferty.
Richard Stowe, Lafferty's and Diana's ecclesiastical leader, served on the church council
that decided to excommunicate Lafferty. He also counseled Diana during the divorce
proceedings and helped her obtain financial aid from the LDS Church. Id. at \ 9.
2

The School of the Prophets disbanded as a result of the disagreement.
3

However, before they had traveled far, Dan said that he felt impressed to turn around and
return to Allen's apartment. When they arrived, Dan went to the door and knocked. This
time, Brenda answered. Id. atfflf11-12.
Dan pushed past Brenda into the apartment and remained inside alone with Brenda
for a few minutes. The men in the car heard the two fighting inside the apartment. Lafferty
left the car and entered the apartment. Id. at \ 13.
Carnes testified that, once Lafferty entered the apartment, he could hear Lafferty
calling Brenda a "bitch" and a "liar," and that he could hear Brenda being beaten. Carnes
heard Brenda screaming, "Don't hurt my baby. Please don't hurt my baby." He could also
hear the baby crying, "Mommy, mommy, mommy." The apartment then became quiet. Id.
A few minutes later, Lafferty and Dan exited from the rear of the apartment and
returned to the car. Their clothes were covered in blood. Id.
The men next drove to Low's home. On the way, Lafferty commented that Low's
small size would make her an easy target. When they reached Low's home and determined
that no one was there, the men broke into the home and took numerous items. Id. at \ 14.
As they left Low's home, Lafferty began talking about going on to Stowe's home. On
the way, the men accidentally missed the turnoff to Stowe's home. Lafferty and Dan decided
to abandon trying to fulfill the rest of the "removal revelation" that day. They headed toward
Wendover. /</. atfflf14-15.
Carnes testified that, on the way to Wendover, Lafferty pulled a knife out of his boot,
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started to bang it on his knee, and said, "I killed her. I killed her. I killed the bitch, I can't
believe I killed her." He then handed the knife to Dan, and said, "Thank you, Brother, for
doing the baby because I don't think I had it in me." Dan replied, "It was no problem." Id.
at1[15.3
In Wendover, the four men rented a small kitchenette apartment where they cleaned
up, ate, and spent the night. The next night, Knapp and Carnes, afraid of what the Lafferty
brothers said they had done, quietly left the apartment and drove away in the car. While
traveling along Interstate 80, they found the knife in the car. They rolled the knife in a towel
and threw it out the window. Later in Twin Falls, Idaho, they disposed of a bag of bloody
clothing and other personal effects belonging to Lafferty and Dan. They then proceeded to
Carnes' brother's house in Cheyenne, Wyoming, where they were arrested on July 30,1984.
Ttf.atf 16.
On August 17,1984, FBI agents took Lafferty and Dan into custody in Reno, Nevada.
Id.
When Allen Lafferty arrived home from work on the evening of July 24, 1984, he
found his wife and fifteen-month-old daughter dead. Brenda was in the kitchen lying in a
pool of blood. She had suffered a severe beating and had contusions and bruises on her face,
head, shoulders, arms, thigh, knees, and back. Evidence established that a vacuum cord had
been tightly and repeatedly wrapped around her neck. A six-inch-long incision had sliced

3

Dan testified at trial that he alone killed both Brenda and Erica. Id. at \ 15 n. 8.
5

through her trachea, both jugular veins, and both carotid arteries. She had a cut on her spinal
column. Blood was smeared on the walls, drapes, door, and light switches. There was
evidence throughout the apartment of a major struggle. Id. at \ 17.
Fifteen-month-old Erica lay in a puddle of blood, propped against the back of her crib
with her head slumped over. Erica's throat was cut from ear to ear. The incision sliced
through both her carotid arteries, both jugular veins, and her esophagus. Her cervical spinal
column also was cut. Only bone and a little tissue attached her head to her body. Both
Brenda and Erica were alive when their throats were slit. Id. at ^ 18.
The State charged Lafferty with capital murder and related crimes. A jury convicted
him and sentenced him to death on the capital murder charges. This Court affirmed. State
v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988).
However, on federal collateral review, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit ordered Lafferty's convictions and sentences vacated. Lafferty v. Cook, 949
F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 504 U.S. 911 (1992).
On retrial, a second jury convicted Lafferty and sentenced him to death. This Court
affirmed. State v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342, 2001 UT 19. The United States Supreme Court
denied review. Lafferty v. Utah, 534 U.S. 1018 (2001).
POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
On September 25,2002, the post-conviction court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 7835a-202 (West 2004), appointed counsel to represent Lafferty in his post-conviction

6

challenge to his capital murder conviction and death sentence.4 After counsel filed Lafferty's
October 10,2002, Preliminary Petition for Habeas Corpus and/or Post Conviction Relief (R.
5-1), Lafferty moved for and the State agreed to stay Lafferty's death sentence. The State
further agreed that Lafferty could file an amended petition and would have eight months to
investigate, prepare, and file that petition. October 10, 2002, Minute Entry filed in the
criminal case.5
However, at the end of that period, Lafferty's counsel moved to withdraw due to a
potential conflict of interest. The post-conviction court granted the motion. (R. 14-12.)
On November 13,2003, the post-conviction court appointed replacement counsel (R.
22). On January 2, 2004, nearly two months after their appointment, replacement counsel
moved to appoint an investigator and a mitigation specialist to assist in preparing the
amended petition (R. 76-70).
On October 29, 2004 - nearly one year after the post-conviction court appointed
Lafferty's replacement counsel and over two years after Lafferty filed his Preliminary
Petition and obtained an execution stay - Lafferty filed his Petitioner's Second Amended

4

The September 25, 2002, order and minute entry appointing counsel are part of
the criminal record in State v. Lafferty, case no. 841409309 (Utah County). The State
asks the Court to take judicial notice of that minute entry. Utah R. Evid. 201; In re F.M.,
57 P.3d 1130, 2002 UT App 340 13 n.2 (Courts may "'take judicial notice of the records
and prior proceedings in the same case'") (citation omitted).
5

The State asks the court to take judicial notice of that minute entry.
7

Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Amended Petition") (R. 230-205).6 Approximately four months
later, the State moved to dismiss the Amended Petition (R. 323-253). After receiving
Lafferty's opposition, the State made clear that it sought dismissal with prejudice on all of
Lafferty's claims (R. 491 at 3).
After full briefing and argument, the post-conviction court granted the State's
summary judgment motion, dismissed Lafferty's Amended Petition with prejudice, and
denied post-conviction relief (R. 478-76, 473-26 (addendum B)).
Lafferty timely appealed (R. 483).
The argument sections include additional relevant facts.
ARGUMENT SUMMARY
1. Procedurally barred claims. The post-conviction court dismissed as procedurally
barred all of the claims that Lafferty could have, but did not raise on direct appeal. The court
reasoned that Lafferty had sufficient information to raise those claims on direct appeal.
For the first time on post-conviction appeal, Lafferty complains that the postconviction court cited no evidence that he had sufficient facts to raise those claim on direct
appeal. However, in the post-conviction court, Lafferty in effect conceded that he did have
the necessary facts. In opposition to the State's procedural bar defense, Lafferty relied
exclusively on the ineffective-assistance exception. To succeed on that exception, he had to
prove that the claims were obvious from the record. By claiming that his direct appeal
6

Lafferty misnamed the petition because he had filed no previous amended
petition.
8

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claims, he necessarily conceded that his counsel
could have raised the claims.
The post-conviction court also refused to apply the ineffective-assistance exception
because Lafferty included no ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel

claim in his

Amended Petition. The court concluded that raising it in his summary judgment opposition
was an improper attempt to raise a new claim in the opposition memorandum. On appeal,
Lafferty argues that the procedurally barred claims implied ineffective-assistance. Lafferty
may mean one or both of the following: 1) the barred claims implied ineffective assistance
because appellate counsel had a constitutional obligation to raise every nonfrivolous claim;
2) the barred claims were so obviously meritorious that appellate counsel had a constitutional
obligation to raise them. Controlling law forecloses the first argument. Lafferty includes not
analysis or authority to support the second.
Finally, Lafferty offers no support or analysis for ruling in his favor on any of the
barred claims' merits. As to each claim, he must show that appellate counsel overlooked a
claim that was obvious from the record and that probably would have succeeded. Lafferty
merely recites the legal standard he must meet. Such conclusory recitations fail as a matter
of law to demonstrate a basis for relief.
2. ABA Guidelines for post-conviction representation. Lafferty claimed that he was
entitled to post-conviction relief from his criminal conviction and death sentence because his
post-conviction counsel allegedly could not comply with the American Bar Association
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Guidelines for prosecuting the post-conviction challenge to his capital murder conviction and
death sentence. Lafferty did not oppose summary judgment on this claim. That failure
waived any appellate challenge to granting it.
Alternatively, the claim failed as a matter of law. Lafferty was entitled to postconviction relief only if he could prove a defect in his conviction or sentence. Whether postconviction counsel could comply with the ABA Guidelines for post-conviction representation
has nothing to do with whether Lafferty's criminal conviction and sentence were sound.
3. Newly discovered "mere impeachment" evidence. Lafferty claimed that he had
discovered new impeachment evidence for one of the mental health evaluators who found him
competent to proceed with the criminal trial. The post-conviction court correctly granted
summary judgment on this claim. First, the Post-Conviction Remedies Act bars relief for
newly discovered evidence that is "mere impeachment" evidence. Lafferty clearly had no
other use for the new evidence.
Second, Lafferty never provided the new impeachment evidence to the post-conviction
court. He alleged in his Amended Petition only that the evaluator testified in an unrelated
proceeding in a way that conflicted with his testimony in Lafferty's competency hearing.
However, Lafferty never presented the actual testimony from the unrelated proceeding.
Without it, the post-conviction court had no way to assess whether the testimony in fact
conflicted. On appeal, Lafferty claims that he will develop the evidence further at an
evidentiary hearing. However, the State's summary judgment motion required him to provide

10

the evidence to demonstrate that a hearing was necessary. Because he failed to do so, the
post-conviction court correctly granted summary judgment on this claim.
4. Ineffective assistance claims. Lafferty raised several challenges to his trial and
appellate counsel's representation. To succeed, Lafferty had to prove both objectively
deficient performance, and that specific deficient acts or omissions prejudiced his case.
Lafferty's claims all failed as a matter of law on the undisputed facts.
a. Sequestering the jury. During the trial, one of the jurors expressed to religious
teachers his sympathy for some of Lafferty's political and religious views. The teachers gave
the juror a blessing in which they instructed the juror not to be deceived by Lafferty. The trial
court discovered the incident and removed the juror before the case was submitted to the jury.
Lafferty argues that, because the case was a high profile death-penalty case, his trial
counsel should have moved to sequester the jury. However, he cites no authority for the
proposition that the Sixth Amendment requires counsel in every high profile death-penalty
case to ask the trial court to sequester the jury.
Also, he proffered no evidence or law to show that he could ever prove the requisite
prejudice. Lafferty complained below and complains on appeal only that he lost the benefit
of a juror sympathetic to some of Ms refigious and poffticaf beliefs. However, he had a
constitutional right only to an impartial jury, not to a jury disposed in his favor. It appears that
he got an impartial jury. Lafferty could not prove the requisite prejudice by pointing only to
the idiosyncracies of a particular juror.

11

b. Penalty-phase instructions and death-qualifying the jury. Lafferty asked for postconviction relief based on alleged errors in the penalty-phase instructions, and because the
trial court death-qualified the jury. He does not acknowledge on appeal that the postconviction court found both claims procedurally barred.
As to the death-qualification claim, Lafferty asserts that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise that issue. However, the criminal case docket demonstrates that
trial counsel did raise that issue.
In any event, any challenge to the death-qualification process would have failed under
controlling law at the time of Lafferty's retrial, including under this Court's opinion in
Lafferty's first direct appeal. Lafferty's counsel during the retrial would have been well
aware of that precedent: the same counsel represented Lafferty in the first direct appeal where
this Court rejected Lafferty's constitutional challenge to the death-qualification process.
Lafferty had no constitutional right to counsel who would re-raise a claim that counsel knew
was foreclosed by controlling law.
c. Mitigation evidence. Lafferty challenged trial counsel's penalty-phase investigation
and presentation. However, with one exception, trial counsel presented all of the mitigation
evidence that Lafferty developed and proffered in the post-conviction proceeding. Lafferty's
post-conviction expert admitted, and the post-conviction court found, that the one exception
was unremarkable. Because trial counsel presented all of the material mitigation evidence that
Lafferty claims he should have presented, this claim failed as a matter of law.

12

d. Trial and appellate counsel's qualifications. Lafferty sought post-conviction relief
because his trial and appellate counsel allegedly did not meet the qualifications prescribed by
the ABA Guidelines and Utah R. Crim. P. 8 for attorneys representing persons facing a death
sentence. However, the Sixth Amendment guaranteed Lafferty counsel who would perform
to certain standards, not to counsel who met certain qualifications. In addition, rule 8
expressly prohibits founding an ineffective-assistance claim on counsel's failure to meet its
qualification requirements. Finally, Lafferty proffered no evidence to support the factual
predicate: that counsel did not meet the referenced qualifications.
e. Prosecutorial misconduct. Lafferty complained that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to object to part of the prosecutor's penalty-phase closing argument. According
to Lafferty, that failure imposed on him the burden of meeting the higher plain error standard
on direct appeal. However, on direct appeal, this Court rejected the claim on the same
elements that Lafferty would have had to demonstrate even if trial counsel had preserved the
claim: no error and no prejudice. Therefore, counsel's failure to object did not affect the
appellate outcome.
f. Appellate challenge to the failure to change venue. Lafferty faulted his appellate
counsel for failing to seek relief based on the denied motion to change venue. However, the
reason to change venue is to ensure that a defendant is tried by an impartial jury. Lafferty
proffered no evidence that a biased jury tried him. Therefore, he failed to proffer evidence
that appellate counsel overlooked a claim that was obvious from the trial record and that
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probably would have succeeded.
5. Conflict of interest. Lafferty claimed that the attorney who represented him at his
second trial had a conflict of interest because that attorney represented his brother Dan during
Dan's trial for the same murder. However, Lafferty proffered no proof that, at the time of his
re-trial nine years after Dan's case concluded, his trial counsel had a continuing duty to Dan;
that any unidentified continuing duty placed counsel in the position of having to choose to
advance Dan's interests to Lafferty's detriment; or that counsel actually did so. To the
contrary, counsel called Dan, his former client, to accept full responsibility for physically
committing both murders. Then, counsel relied on Dan's testimony to argue that Lafferty was
the less culpable of the two; therefore, he should not receive a death sentence. The claim
failed as a matter of law on the undisputed facts.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE POST-CONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY DENIED RELIEF
ON THE CLAIMS THAT LAFFERTY COULD HAVE, BUT DID NOT
RAISE ON DIRECT APPEAL
The Post-Conviction Remedies Act ("PCRA") bars relief for claims that could have
been, but were not raised on direct appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(c) (2) (West's
2004). The PCRA includes an exception to that bar if the petitioner demonstrates that his
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claims on direct appeal. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-35a-106(2) (West's 2004). Once the State asserts the procedural bar defense, the
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burden shifts to the petitioner to disprove it. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-105 (West 2004). In
the context of the ineffective-assistance exception to the procedural bar, the petitioner must
prove that his appellate counsel was ineffective for omitting the procedurally barred claims.
Id. Cf also Carter v. Galetka, 44 P.3d 626,2001 UT 96ffif14-16 (holding under pre-PCRA
law that the claims that Carter could and should have raised on direct appeal were
procedurally barred because Carter failed to prove that "unusual circumstances" justified
reaching them in post-conviction review).
The post-conviction court found that several of Lafferty' s post-conviction claims were
procedurally barred under this rule because Lafferty could have, but did not raise them on
direct appeal (R. 459-55). The court refused to apply the only exception to the bar that
Lafferty asserted: appellate counsel's alleged ineffective assistance. The post-conviction
court's denial of relief was correct.
A.

Lafferty's reliance on the ineffective-assistance procedural bar exception in effect
conceded that he could have raised the barred claims on direct appeal;
alternatively, he cites nothing to support A contrary conclusion.
The post-conviction court concluded that Lafferty had sufficient facts available to him

during the direct appeal to raise the challenged claims then (R. 456). In this post-conviction
appeal, Lafferty appears to challenge that conclusion, arguing that "there is not a solitary
reference to a single evidentiary fact that is supportive of the [post-conviction] court's 'view
of the record"5 that he had sufficient facts to raise the claims on direct appeal. Appellant's
Brief at 18.
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Yet, in the post-conviction court, Lafferty effectively conceded that he had sufficient
information to raise the challenged claims on direct appeal. Lafferty sought to excuse his
failure to raise the claims on direct appeal and avoid the procedural bar by relying exclusively
on the exception to the procedural bar: that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise the claims. (R.344). Utah Code Ann. §78-3 5a-106(2) (West 2004). Appellate counsel
could not have been ineffective for failing to raise the claims unless they were obvious from
the record. Carter v. Galetka, 44 P.3d 626,2001 UT 96, ^[48. Thus, Lafferty in effect argued
that, not only could he have raised the claims on direct appeal, but that his counsel had a
constitutional obligation to do so because they were obvious from the record.
By conceding to the post-conviction court that he could have raised the claims on direct
appeal, he invited any error in the post-conviction court's acceptance of his concession. See,
e.g., State v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342, 2001 UT 19 \3A n.9 (Lafferty invited any error in
competency experts' failure to produce written reports when he asked to proceed without
them), cert denied, 122 S. Ct. 542 (2001). This Court will not reverse on an invited error.
Id. The claim fails for that reason alone.
Alternatively, the claim fails because Lafferty demonstrates no error. Lafferty cites to
no law or facts supporting his new argument that he could not have raised any of the barred
claims on direct appeal. The argument fails for that reason as well. See Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(9)(requiring parties to provide supporting contentions and reasons for their arguments
and to include the grounds for reviewing unpreserved issues). Cf also State v. Honie, 57 P.3d
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977,2002 UT 61 f 61 n.7 (declining to adopt a state constitutional rule where Honie had not
demonstrated in "any meaningful way" why the Court should apply cited constitutional
provisions to create the proposed rule), cert, denied, 537 U.S. 863 (2002).
B.

Lafferty has demonstrated no error in the post-conviction court's conclusion that
he could not rely on ineffective-assistance because it was a new claim first raised
in a summary judgment opposition.
In refusing to apply the ineffective-assistance exception to the procedural bar, the post-

conviction court reasoned, in part, that it was "a new claim that was not previously raised in
[Lafferty's] . . . amended petition, and raising new claims in a memorandum opposing
summary judgment is improper" (R. 457-56 (citation omitted)).
On appeal, Lafferty argues that the claims that he first raised in post-conviction implied
ineffective-assistance. Lafferty continues that each claim "is a recitation of a failure to act
as a prudent attorney." Appellant's Brief at 19-20.
Lafferty may mean either that 1) he had a constitutional right to appellate counsel who
would raise every non-frivolous claim; or 2) any or all of the claims are so plainly meritorious
that appellate counsel must have been ineffective for omitting them. Clearly controlling law
forecloses the first argument. See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (indigent
appellants have no constitutional right "to compel appointed counsel to press nonfrivolous
points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment, decides not
to present those points"). Cf. also Cargyle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2003)
("counsel 'need not (and should not) raise every nonfrivolous claim, but rather may select
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from among them in order to maximize the likelihood of success on appeal'") (quoting Smith
v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288 (2000)).
Lafferty offers no analysis or authority to support the second argument that the claims
were so obviously meritorious that appellate counsel had a constitutional obligation to raise
them. The Court should reject it for that reason alone. See, e.g., State v. Honie, 2002 UT 61
f61n.7. 7

7

As one example, Lafferty claimed in the Amended Petition that the deathqualification process is unconstitutional (R. 224-23). At the time of his second direct
appeal, that challenge was not so obviously meritorious that counsel had a clear
obligation to raise it. To the contrary, controlling law foreclosed it. See, e.g, Lockhart v.
McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 167-84 (1986) (although questioning the validity of studies
offered to demonstrate that death-qualified juries are more conviction-prone, the Supreme
Court nevertheless assumed the studies demonstrated that proposition, but still found that
death qualifying juries did not violate McCree's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial
jury); State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 237-38 (Utah 1985) (recognizing that Moore's data
purporting to demonstrate that death-qualified juries are more inclined to convict "may
well be correct," but rejecting the argument that such a result would violate Moore's right
to trial by an impartial jury). Indeed, Lafferty's appellate counsel had raised and lost that
very argument on Lafferty's first direct appeal. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1241,
1253 (Utah 1988) (relying on McCree, the Court perfunctorily rejected Lafferty's
argument that death-qualifying the jury resulted in a conviction-prone jury), habeas
corpus granted on other grounds, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991). Lafferty had no
constitutional right to counsel who would re-raise futile arguments. See State v.
Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 58-59 (Utah 1982) (holding that defense counsel's performance
was not deficient by failing to object to the admission of evidence he had already
unsuccessfully challenged in a suppression hearing), overruled on other grounds, State v.
Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689
(1984) (the Court must evaluate counsel's conduct from counsel's perspective at the
time); Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1052 (10th Cir.) ("we have rejected ineffective
assistance claims where a defendant 'faults his former counsel not for failing to find
existing law, but for failing to predict future law' and have warned 'that clairvoyance is
not a required attribute of effective representation'"), cert, denied, 123 S. Ct. 703 (2002).
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C.

The post-conviction court correctly concluded that Lafferty raised no genuine,
material fact issue on his ineffective-assistance claims related to the procedurally
barred claims
The post-conviction court ruled alternatively that Lafferty had demonstrated no

genuine issue of material fact on his assertion that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing
to raise the barred claims (R. 456). That ruling was correct.
When the State alleged that Lafferty's claims were procedurally barred, the burden
shifted to Lafferty to disprove the bar. § 78-3 5a-105. As stated, Lafferty relied solely on the
procedural bar exception that his appellate counsel was ineffective for omitting the claims at
issue (R. 344). See § 78-35a-106(2). In order to demonstrate the requisite ineffectiveassistance, Lafferty had the burden of proving that his appellate counsel omitted claims that
1) were obvious from the record, and 2) probably would have resulted in reversal. Carter v.
Galetka, 2001 UT 96 ^[48. Lafferty had to plead all of the facts supporting his ineffectiveassistance claim. Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(c)(3). Further, the State's summary judgment motion
cast on Lafferty the burden of making his "best showing" in support of his ineffective
assistance claims. Brandt v. Springville Banking Co., 353 P.2d 460, 462 (Utah 1960)
(summary judgment has a "salutary purpose in our procedure because it eliminates the time,
trouble and expense of a trial when, upon the best showing the plaintiff can make, he would
not be entitled to a judgment").
In the post-conviction court, Lafferty stated only, "the failure of Petitioner's previous
counsel to raise those claims is a direct evidence of the ineffective assistance of counsel" (R.
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344).

He proffered no proof or legal analysis to demonstrate that appellate counsel

overlooked any claim that was obvious from the record and that probably would have
succeeded.
On appeal, Lafferty again relies on conclusory statements like "had prior counsel
actually provided effective assistance, then these claims would have been brought on direct
appeal"; "effective assistance . . . mandated that the issues now raised by his current counsel
. . . had to be raised by prior counsel"; "[t]he fact that [appellate] counsel did not bring these
claims... demonstrates a lack of competence and ineffective assistance"; if appellate counsel
intentionally omitted the claims, his representation "was woefully below a recognized
standard of competence"; and, if not intentional, "there is no other conclusion that can be
drawn but that counsel was ignorant of the law." Appellant's Brief at 15-16.
In effect, Lafferty's conclusory statements merely recite the legal conclusion that he
had to prove: that his counsel had a constitutional obligation to raise each of the barred claims.
However, Lafferty had the burden of proving to a demonstrable reality that such an obligation
arose. To do so, he had the burden of proving that each of the barred claims was obvious
from the record. Merely reciting the legal conclusion that he had to prove was insufficient
below to create a genuine, material fact issue, and is insufficient on appeal to show that the
post-conviction court erroneously overlooked one. See Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870,877
(Utah 1993) (petitioner must prove ineffective assistance to a demonstrable reality; mere
repetition of the legal standard will not suffice); Brandt v. Springville Banking Co., 353 P.2d
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at 462.
Lafferty also had the burden of making his "best showing" that the barred claims
probably would have succeeded if appellate counsel had pressed them in his direct appeal.
See Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96 ^J48; Brandt v. Springville Banking Co., 353 P.2d at 462.
In the post-conviction court, Lafferty did not even argue this element, let alone provide any
record or legal support for it. On appeal, he still cites to no law or facts to demonstrate that
any of the omitted claims probably would have succeeded on direct appeal. The postconviction court correctly found that Lafferty insufficiently supported his ineffectiveassistance assertion to justify excusing his failure to raise the claims on direct appeal.
In this appeal, Lafferty argues only that he "suffered prejudice because these claims
were never heard by the [Cjourt

" Appellant's Brief at 16. This is insufficient establish

As to his claim that the trial court should have sequestered the jury, Lafferty
argues that the post-conviction court overlooked his statement that counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise that issue. Appellant's Brief at 20-21. To the extent
Lafferty contends that merely uttering the words "ineffective assistance" will defeat the
bar, he is wrong. As demonstrated, he had the burden of proving ineffective assistance to
a demonstrable reality. "Ineffective assistance" is not an incantation whose mere
utterance will vanquish a procedural bar defense. In any event, the oversight does not
affect this appeal's outcome. As demonstrated in point IV, the ineffective-assistance
claim based on counsel's failure to ask to sequester the jury failed as a matter of law.
Lafferty also states that his claim that trial counsel failed to hire a mitigation
specialist is a new claim not raised on direct appeal; therefore, according to Lafferty, the
post-conviction court should not have granted summary judgment on that claim.
Appellant's Brief at 21. The argument appears in Lafferty's point addressing a
procedural bar ruling. However, the post-conviction court did not find that this claim was
procedurally barred (R. 459 n.3). As detailed in point IV, the post-conviction court
correctly concluded that Lafferty's "best showing" failed as a matter of law to
demonstrate that he may be entitled to relief on the claim's merits.
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the requisite prejudice. Lafferty had to prove that appellate counsel failed to present to this
Court a claim that probably would have resulted in reversal. It is not enough to show only that
the Court never heard non-meritorious or harmless claims.
POINT II
LAFFERTY WAIVED HIS CLAIM THAT HE WAS ENTITLED TO
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF BECAUSE HIS POST-CONVICTION
COUNSEL DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE ABA GUIDELINES;
ALTERNATIVELY, THE CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW
The American Bar Association ("ABA") has promulgated a set of duties for counsel
prosecuting post-conviction actions involving a death sentence. ABA Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Defense counsel in Death Penalty Cases, Guideline 10.15.1
- Duties of Post-Conviction Counsel.9 Lafferty sought post-conviction relief from his
criminal conviction and death sentence because his post-conviction counsel allegedly could
not comply with the post-conviction duties that the ABA Guidelines describe (R. 213).10
Lafferty did not oppose the State's summary judgment motion on this claim. The post-

9

These guidelines appear in a section separate from those that prescribe the duties
imposed on counsel representing a defendant in a criminal proceeding who is facing a
possible death sentence.
10

At least one of those prescribed duties conflicts with clearly controlling Utah
law. Utah law prohibits post-conviction relief based on claims that were raised and lost
on direct appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(b) (1996). See also Carter v.
Galetka, 44 P.3d 626, 2001 UT 96ffi[6-9 (affirming under pre-PCRA law the dismissal
of sixteen claims, some with multiple subclaims, under the "abuse of the writ" procedural
bar because they had been previously addressed on direct appeal). However, the ABA
instructs that counsel in post-conviction death-penalty cases "should seek to litigate all
issues, whether or not previously presented .. .." ABA Guideline 10.15.1(C)
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conviction court granted summary judgment; however, the court did not rely solely on
Lafferty's failure to oppose the motion. Instead, the court also concluded that Lafferty's
allegations in his petition failed as a matter of law to state a basis for relief. (R. 455.)
On appeal, Lafferty argues for the first time that the post-conviction court should have
considered the allegations in his Amended Petition (which the court did), and that the claim
was meritorious. His arguments state no basis for reversal.
A,

Because Lafferty did not oppose summary judgment on this claim, he waived any
appellate challenge to granting it
Lafferty's failure to oppose summary judgment on this claim waived his appellate

challenge to the post-conviction court's decision to grant it. Busch Corp, v. State Farm Fire
& Casualty, Co., 743 P.2d 1217,1219 (Utah 1987) (refusing to review challenges to an order
granting summary judgment where the nonmoving did not oppose the summary judgment
motion). The Court should reject Lafferty's arguments for that reason alone.
B.

Alternatively, Lafferty has demonstrated no error in the post-conviction court's
conclusion that the claim failed as a matter of law.
Lafferty sought post-conviction relief because his post-conviction counsel allegedly

could not comply with the ABA Guidelines for prosecuting a post-conviction challenge to a
capital murder conviction and death sentence (R. 213). The post-conviction court concluded
that Lafferty's allegations, even "if proven and believed," would not warrant post-conviction
relief (R. 455). That ruling was correct.
In essence, this claim asks this Court to set aside Lafferty's capital murder conviction
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and death sentence due to alleged defects in the post-conviction proceedings, not in the
criminal proceedings. However, the PCRA permits relief from a criminal conviction or
sentence based on specified defects in either, not on alleged defects in the post-conviction
proceedings. Utah Code Ann. 78-35a-104 (West 2004).
This Court rejected a similar claim in Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah), cert
denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1992), under pre-PCRA law. Parsons asked the Court to excuse his
failure to prove prejudice on his post-conviction ineffective-assistance claims because he
lacked the funds to do meet that burden.11 Id. at 523. This Court declined to do so. Id.
Similarly, Lafferty asked the post-conviction court to set aside his capital murder
conviction and death sentence because time and money constraints made it impossible for his
counsel to fulfill the duties outline by the ABA (R. 213). Parsons and the PCRA's plain
language permits relief only for proved defects in the conviction or sentence, not for defects
in the post-conviction process challenging the conviction and sentence. The post-conviction
court correctly denied relief on this claim.
Lafferty's authority, presented for the first time on appeal, does not support a contrary
conclusion. Lafferty relies on Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) for the proposition that
the ABA Guidelines serve as guides to determining what is reasonable in a death-penalty

11

Parsons predates the statutory funding for the "[c]osts of counsel and other
reasonable litigation expenses incurred" in a post-conviction death-penalty case. Utah
Code Ann. § 78-35a-202 (West 2004).
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12

case.
However, Wiggins created no right to post-conviction counsel who would represent
Lafferty according to the ABA Guidelines for prosecuting post-conviction death-penalty cases.
Wiggins looked to that ABA Guidelines as one factor in assessing trial counsel's performance
in the criminal proceedings where his client enjoyed a Sixth Amendment right to the effective
assistance of counsel. Id. at 524-25; 546-48. However, the Supreme Court has consistently
recognized that there is no Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of state postconviction counsel. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (1991) (refusing to
excuse Coleman's procedural default based on state post-conviction counsel's failure to file
a timely appeal notice because Coleman had no right to the effective assistance of state postconviction counsel). Thus, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that Lafferty appears
to advance: that he has a constitutional right to post-conviction counsel who will prosecute his

12

Lafferty continues that the ABA Guidelines "list the minimum requirements that
defense counsel should meet." Appellant's Brief at 23. However, the Supreme Court
recognized that they are "only guides" in assessing the reasonableness of trial counsel's
performance. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 546-47. The Supreme Court did not hold that
they set "minimum requirements." To the contrary, the Supreme Court cited to its
Strickland precedent declining to adopt the ABA Guidelines as rules for representation.
Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984) (the ABA Guidelines
are "only guides" to what constitutes objectively reasonable representation under the
Sixth Amendment; "[n]o particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can
satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the
range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant. Any
such set of rules would interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of
counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions")).
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post-conviction case in accordance with the ABA Guidelines.13
POINT III
LAFFERTY'S NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE IS "MERE
IMPEACHMENT" EVIDENCE; THEREFORE, THE PCRA BARS
RELIEF.
ALTERNATIVELY, LAFFERTY PROFFERED NO
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CLAIM
Stephen Golding, Ph.D., was one of four evaluators who found Lafferty competent to
proceed in the criminal trial. State v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342, 2001 UT 19ffl[23-26, cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 1018 (2001). Lafferty claimed in his Amended Petition that Dr. Golding
"indicated that [Lafferty] could be determined as 'situationally competent."' Lafferty asserted
that, on "information and belief," Dr. Golding subsequently testified in the Brian David
Mitchell prosecution that Mitchell "could not be situationally competent and that theory was
Although the claim fails because it has no legal support, the undisputed facts also
undercut Lafferty's allegations that he lacked the time and money necessary to investigate
and prepare his post-conviction case. Lafferty had two years to prepare the Amended
Petition; his replacement counsel had one year from the time of their appointment.
Replacement counsel delayed for nearly two months of that one-year period before asking
for an investigator and mitigation expert to assist in preparing the Amended Petition.
"Delay is the name of the game in death penalty cases." Burns v. Parke, 95 F.3d 465,
471 n.l (7th Cir. 1996) (Manion, J. concurring).
The PCRA and related administrative rule gave Lafferty $20,000 for investigators,
experts, and consultants, and up to $30,000 for attorney fees. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a202 (West 2004); Utah Admin. R. 25-14. Lafferty proffered no proof that these sums
were insufficient. To the contrary, rather than focusing their post-conviction resources on
finding something critical that trial counsel overlooked, Lafferty squandered some or all
of the $20,000 for post-conviction experts and investigators to recreate the same
mitigation case in the post-conviction proceedings that failed to spare him from a death
sentence in the criminal proceedings. See point IV. Moreover, Lafferty had a means of
challenging the funding limits set by the administrative rule. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46a12 and 12.1 (West 2004). Nothing in the record establishes that he ever attempted to do
so.
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inaccurate." (R. 226-25.)14
The post-conviction court denied the claim because 1) the PCRA does not permit relief
for newly discovered evidence that is "mere impeachment"; and 2) Lafferty did not provide
Dr. Golding's Mitchell testimony (R. 454-53). That disposition was correct.
A.

The post-trial discovery of "mere impeachment" evidence will not support postconviction relief.
The post-conviction court correctly recognized that the PCRA precludes relief based

on newly discovered evidence that is "mere impeachment" evidence. Utah Code Ann. § 7835a-104(e)(iii) (West 2004). On appeal, Lafferty argues that this Court recently "helped
interpret and refine" the PCRA, then cites State v. Finder, 114 P.3d 551,2005 UT 15, for the
proposition that "'newly discovered impeachment evidence can justify the granting of a new
trial in certain situations.'" Appellant's Brief at 24 (citing State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15 \ 66
n.l 1 (emphasis in Lafferty's brief).
Lafferty falsely suggests that Finder modified the PCRA. In fact, this Court expressly
declined in Finder to address the PCRA's proscription of relief for newly discovered "mere
impeachment" evidence. State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15 ^f 66 n.l 1. The post-conviction court
correctly denied relief because the PCRA's plain language precluded it, and Lafferty's
misstatement of Finder demonstrates no error in that disposition.15
14

Brian David Mitchell is being prosecuted for the highly publicized kidnapping
and rape of Elizabeth Smart.
X5

Pinder also recognized the general rule that "'newly discovered evidence does
not warrant a new trial where its only use is impeachment.'" Id, at \ 66 (citation omitted).
27

B.

The post-conviction court correctly granted summary judgment because Lafferty
did not provide the court with the allegedly contradictory testimony.
In his Amended Petition, Lafferty relied on "information and belief that Dr. Golding's

Mitchell testimony conflicted with his testimony in Lafferty's case (R. 226-25). However,
Lafferty never provided the post-conviction court with Dr. Golding's actual testimony.
Without Dr. Golding's actual Mitchell testimony, it was impossible for the post-conviction
court to determine whether that testimony actually contradicted his testimony in Lafferty's
case.
Even accepting Lafferty's allegation at face value does not establish that Dr. Golding
contradicted himself. A fair reading of Lafferty's recitation is that Dr. Golding testified in
Mitchell only that the "situational competency" theory did not fit the facts of that case, and not
that it was an invalid theory in all circumstances, including Lafferty's. Thus, the postconviction court correctly granted summary judgment on this claim because Lafferty supported
it with no evidence.
On appeal, Lafferty argues that he will develop the supporting evidence in a post-appeal
evidentiary hearing. Appellant's Brief at 25. However, Lafferty was not entitled to withhold
the evidence related to the claim until an evidentiary hearing. This Court has recognized that
summary judgment has a "salutary purpose in our procedure because it eliminates the time,

Here, Lafferty states that he could have used the newly discovered evidence to
"discredit[]" Dr. Golding's conclusions in his case. Appellant's Brief at 26. He identifies
no other use for the evidence. Thus, even under the general rule acknowledged in Pinder,
Lafferty would not be entitled to relief for his newly discovered evidence.
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trouble and expense of a trial when, upon the best showing the plaintiff can make, he would
not be entitled to a judgment." Brandt v. Springville Banking Co., 353 P.2d 460, 462 (Utah
1960). Lafferty was required to produce the allegedly contradictory testimony. Lafferty had
eighteen months from the time the post-conviction court appointed replacement counsel until
they filed Lafferty's summary judgment opposition in which to acquire Dr. Golding's Mitchell
testimony. Despite that extended period, they never provided the testimony or, from all that
appears in the record, ever tried to acquire it. Allowing Lafferty to withhold the evidence until
an evidentiary hearing would defeat summary judgment's "salutary purpose" of avoiding that
hearing if Lafferty could never prove that Dr. Golding actually testified in the Mitchell case
in a way that contradicted his testimony in Lafferty's case.
C.

The Court may affirm on the alternative basis that Lafferty has not established the
requisite prejudice.
The Court may affirm the outcome on any "'legal ground or theory apparent on the

record.'" See, e.g., Bailey v. Bayles, 52 P.3d 1158,2002 UT 58 f 10 (citation omitted). Here,
the Court may affirm on the alternative ground that Lafferty has not established that Dr.
Golding's Mitchell testimony would have changed the outcome.
The PCRA permits post-conviction relief based on newly discovered evidence only
when the new evidence, "viewed with all the other evidence," would have changed the
outcome. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(e)(iv) (West 2004) (emphasis added). Lafferty
asserts only that he could have used Dr. Golding's Mitchell testimony to impeach Dr.
Golding's conclusion that Lafferty was competent. However, Dr. Golding was only one of
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four evaluators who found Lafferty competent to proceed. State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19 ^f 25,
20P.3d342, cert, denied, 534 U.S. 1018 (2001). Lafferty has not argued that impeaching Dr.
Golding would have so undermined the other evaluators5 conclusions that he would have been
found incompetent to proceed. The Court may affirm on his failure to establish this element
of his newly discovered evidence claim.
POINT IV
THE POST-CONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LAFFERTY5 S INEFFECTIVEASSISTANCE CLAIMS
Lafferty raised several challenges to his trial and appellate counsel's performance. To
succeed on his claims, Lafferty had the burden of proving two elements. First, Lafferty had
to establish constitutionally deficient performance. He had to prove that specific acts or
omissions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, assessing counsel's actions from
counsel's perspective and under the prevailing standards in Utah at the time of his trial.
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523, 525 (2003) ; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687-88, 690 (1984); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966
(1994). He had to overcome a strong presumption that trial counsel rendered constitutionally
sufficient assistance. Stricklandv. Washington, 466U.S.at690; State v. Taylor, 947 P. 2d 681,
685 (Utah 1997), cert denied, 525 U.S. 833 (1998); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d at 522.
Second, Lafferty had to prove prejudice. He had to prove that, but for counsel's
constitutionally deficient performance, there would be a reasonable probability of a more
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favorable result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 695.
Lafferty had to prove the claimed ineffective assistance to a "demonstrable reality"; he
was not entitled to rely on mere speculation or mere repetition of the legal standard. Parsons
v. Barnes, 871 P.2d at 526; Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993). In addition,
Lafferty had the burden of pleading all of the facts in support of his claim, Utah R. Civ. P.
65C(c)(3), and the summary judgment motion placed on him the burden of making his "best
showing" on his ineffective-assistance claims, Brandt v. Springville Banking Co., 353 P.2d
460, 462 (Utah 1960).
The undisputed facts, Lafferty's allegations, and his "best showing" in opposition to
summary judgment demonstrated that his ineffective assistance claims failed as a matter of
law.
A.

Lafferty's challenge to trial counsel's failure to ask to sequester the jury failed as
a matter of law.
Lafferty complained that his trial counsel should have moved to sequester the jury. In

support, he alleged that, during the trial, a juror expressed to religious teachers that he agreed
with Lafferty's religious and constitutional views. The leaders gave the juror a blessing,
instructing the juror that Lafferty was evil and admonishing the juror not to be deceived by
Lafferty. Lafferty alleged that the juror felt compelled to find Lafferty guilty and sentence him
to death. (R. 221.)
However, the trial court discovered the incident, excused the juror before Lafferty's
case was submitted to the jury. The State moved for and the post-conviction court granted
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summary judgment on this claim primarily because the juror was excused and Lafferty offered
no evidence that the incident affected his right to trial by an impartial jury (R. 304-302,388-87,
453-52).
On appeal, Lafferty argues that, in a "high-profile" case such as his, "surely the jury
should have been sequestered to prevent prejudice." Appellant's Brief at 27-28. To the extent
that Lafferty contends that high profile death-penalty cases create a Sixth Amendment duty to
ask to sequester the jury as a matter of course, Lafferty cites no authority for that proposition.
His unsupported contentions fail to overcome the "strong presumption" that his counsel's
representation "[fell] within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689. Similarly, his statements, which are unsupported by any
authority or analysis, demonstrate no error in the post-conviction court's ruling. See, e.g., Utah
R. App. P. 24(a)(9)(requiring parties to provide supporting contentions and reasons for their
arguments); State v. Horde > 57 P.3d 977, 2002 UT 61 \ 61 n.7 (declining to adopt a state
constitutional rule where Honie had not demonstrated in "any meaningful way" why the Court
should apply cited constitutional provisions to create the proposed rule), cert, denied, 537 U.S.
863 (2002).
Lafferty also failed below and fails on appeal to establish that he could have proven
Strickland prejudice. As Lafferty recognizes, he had a right only to an impartial jury.
Appellant's Brief at 26-27. See Const. Amend. 6; Utah Const. Art. I, § 7; State v. Wach, 24
P.3d 948, 2001 UT 35 \ 36; State v. Baker, 935 P.2d 503, 509 (Utah 1997). Cf. State v.
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Menzies, 889 P.2d 393,398 (Utah 1994) ("so long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that
the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the
[Constitution] was violated") (quoting Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988)), cert,
denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995). Lafferty proffered no evidence that trial counsel's failure to
move to sequester the jury resulted in trial by a biased jury.
As he did below, Lafferty argues only that failing to sequester the jury resulted in the
loss of the juror who was sympathetic to some of his religious and political beliefs.
Appellant's Brief at 27. Also as he did below, he cites no authority for the proposition that he
can show Strickland prejudice by demonstrating only that he lost such a juror. To the contrary,
Lafferty had no right to the luck of a lawless sentencer or to consideration of individual juror
idiosyncracies. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 695.
The undisputed facts demonstrate that the trial court removed the tainted juror before
Lafferty's case was decided. Nothing in the record Lafferty provided establishes or even
suggests that Lafferty was denied what constitution guarantees: trial by an impartial jury. The
post-conviction court correctly concluded that this claim failed as a matter of law on the
undisputed facts.
B.

The post-conviction court correctly granted summary judgment against Lafferty
on his post-conviction challenge to the penalty-phase instructions and to deathqualifying the jury.
In the post-conviction court, Lafferty argued that his conviction was unconstitutional

because the penalty-phase instructions allegedly required the jury to find either that death was
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the appropriate penally or that it was reasonably satisfied that it could not do so (R. 224).
Lafferty also claimed that the trial court should not have death-qualified the jury (R. 224-23).
Lafferty repeats both of these claims on appeal. Appellant's Brief at 28-29.
Both are claims that the trial court erred. The post-conviction court granted summary
judgment against Lafferty because Lafferty could have, but did not raise them on direct appeal
(R. 45 8-56). Lafferty has ignored that ruling. For the reasons argued in point I, that ruling was
correct.
Lafferty could have proceeded on the claims in the context of an ineffective-assistance
claim. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-106(2) (West 2004). Lafferty has not argued ineffective
assistance on the jury-instruction claim. However, he does argue that his trial counsel was
ineffective for not objecting to the death-qualification process. Appellant's Brief at 29.16
Lafferty did not preserve this argument below and does not argue plain error on appeal. The
claim fails for that reason alone. See State v. Gulbransen, 106 P.3d 734, 2005 UT 7 ffi[46-48
(rejecting a constitutional claim first raised on appeal where Gulbransen did not argue plain
error).
In addition, Lafferty's factual assertion appears incorrect. The criminal case docket
indicates that, on June 30,1994, trial counsel filed a Motion to Preclude Death Qualification

16

Lafferty argues that counsel "allowed a jury where every member of the jury was
in favor of the death penalty." Appellant's Brief at 29 (emphasis added). Lafferty does
not explain what he means by "in favor of the death penalty." To the extent he argues
that every juror was unconstitutionally pre-disposed to sentence him to death, he provides
no analysis, authority, or record support for that assertion.
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of the Jury Venire.
In any event, Lafferty's ineffective-assistance claim fails as a matter of law. Lafferty's
appellate counsel had a constitutional obligation to identify and apply only existing law. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (the Court must evaluate counsel's
conduct from counsel's perspective at the time); Bullockv. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036,1052 (10th
Cir.) ("we have rejected ineffective assistance claims where a defendant 'faults his former
counsel not for failing to find existing law, but for failing to predict future law' and have
warned 'that clairvoyance is not a required attribute of effective representation'"), cert, denied,
123 S. Ct. 703 (2002). By the time of Lafferty's second appeal, clearly controlling precedent
from this Court and the United States Supreme Court had rejected constitutional challenges to
death qualifying capital juries. See, e.g, Lockhartv. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 167-84 (1986);
State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239,1253 (Utah 1988), habeas corpus granted on other grounds,
949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991). Indeed, the attorney who represented Lafferty during his
second appeal raised and lost a constitutional challenge to the death qualification process on
Lafferty's first appeal. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1241. The Sixth Amendment did not
require counsel to re-assert a claim that he knew contradicted this controlling precedent. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689; Bullockv. Carver, 297 F.3d at 1052 (10th Cir.).
C.

Trial counsel presented all of the material mitigation evidence that Lafferty
contends the Sixth Amendment required him to discover and present.
Below, Lafferty challenged his trial counsel's penalty-phase investigation and

presentation. Among other things, he faulted trial counsel for failing to hire a mitigation
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specialist. To support his claim, he offered social history report prepared by his postconviction mitigation specialist. The post-conviction court rejected the claims primarily
because Lafferty presented in the post-conviction case no material mitigation evidence beyond
that which his trial counsel actually presented to the sentencing jury (R. 450-44).
On appeal, Lafferty relies on legal and factual misstatements to support his challenge
to the post-conviction court's ruling. Lafferty, relying on Wiggins v. Smith, argues that the
failure to do a constitutionally sufficient penalty-phase investigation "is per se ineffective
assistance of counsel." Appellant's Brief at 29 (emphasis added). Lafferty misstates the
Wiggins holding. Wiggins does not hold that investigation failures are "per se" ineffective.
To the contrary, Wiggins still requires the claimant to establish prejudice. Under Wiggins,
Lafferty had to prove that 1) a reasonably competent attorney would have presented the
mitigation evidence developed in the post-conviction case; and 2) there is a reasonable
probability that, if counsel had presented the evidence, at least one juror would have struck the
balance ofaggravating and mitigating evidence in Lafferty's favor. Wigginsv. Smith, 539U.S.
at 534-38.
Lafferty also misstates the record. Lafferty argues that "[t]he only mitigating evidence
that was provided to the jury at the penalty phase... was a short series of prison officials who
indicated that [he] was a relatively trouble-free inmate..., a few pictures from a yearbook, and
some photographs of [Lafferty] with his family." Appellant's Brief at 30 (emphasis added).
Lafferty then lists evidence that he claims "should have been, but [was] not introduced in
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mitigation

" Id. at 30-31.

What Lafferty fails to disclose is that, with one exception, counsel admitted all of the
evidence that he states was not "introduced in mitigation." Counsel admitted it at the guilt
phase and, at the sentencing phase, referred the jury back to the evidence that it already had
heard (R. 300-262, 384-82, 450-44).17 The post-conviction court concluded that the Sixth
Amendment did not require counsel to repeat at the sentencing phase evidence that the jury
already had heard at the guilt phase (R. 445). Lafferty identifies no error in that ruling; to the
contrary, he ignores it, choosing instead to insinuate that the sentencing jury never heard the
evidence at all.
Because trial counsel presented all of the material mitigation evidence that Lafferty now
contends they should have presented, he has not established any deficiency in their
representation or a reasonable probability that the sentencing jury would have given him a
sentence less than death. The post-conviction court correctly found that the claim failed as a
matter of law.
Lafferty also argues that "[a]ny diligent counsel would have investigated exculpatory
evidence and any facts of evidence tampering." Appellant's Brief at 29. The post-conviction

17

The State provided a detailed recitation and comparison of the mitigation case
that counsel presented at trial and the mitigation case that Lafferty presented in the postconviction proceedings (R. 300-262). The post-conviction court did a similar comparison
(R. 450-44). The only thing missing at trial were Lafferty's National Guard records.
However, even Lafferty's post-conviction specialist considered those records
"unremarkable," and the post-conviction court agreed (R. 445 n.6). Lafferty has not
argued the contrary on appeal.
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court rejected these claims because 1) Lafferty identified no facts known to counsel or that
counsel had a constitutional duty to discover that would have triggered a constitutional duty
to investigate exculpatory evidence or the possibility of evidence tampering, and 2) he
identified no additional evidence that his counsel would have found, let alone that they would
have found evidence so significant that it would have made a more favorable outcome
reasonably likely (R. 450-49).
Lafferty has not argued how this ruling was erroneous. He merely repeats the
unsupported conclusions that failed in the post-conviction court. He still cites no facts or law
demonstrating that counsel had a duty to investigate unidentified exculpatory evidence or
unidentified evidence of evidence tampering, what their investigation would have revealed,
or that the unidentified evidence was so compelling that it would have made a more favorable
outcome reasonably likely. The post-conviction court correctly concluded that the claim failed
as a matter of law on the undisputed facts. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d at 687 (finding
that Taylor failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial counsel with respect to
mitigation investigation in part because he identified no mitigation evidence that counsel
overlooked).
D.

Lafferty had no constitutional right to counsel who met certain qualifications.
Lafferty complained below that his trial and appellate counsel did not have the

qualifications established in Utah R. Crim. P. 8 and by the ABA Guidelines for representing
capital defendants (R. 215). The State moved for and the post-conviction court granted
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summary judgment because Lafferty had no constitutional right to counsel who had specific
qualifications (R. 264,3 82,444-42,440-3 8). Lafferty has demonstrated no error in that ruling.
Lafferty had a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel during the
criminal trial and direct appeal. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984);
Carter v. Galetka, 44 P.3d 626, 2001 UT 96 \ 48. However, Strickland establishes no
qualifications that counsel must meet in order to satisfy the constitutional right to effective
assistance. To the contrary, the Stricklandelements of an ineffective-assistance claim look to
what counsel did or did not do and whether counsel's action or inaction adversely affected the
outcome. They do not look to counsel's resume. Id.
Lafferty proffers no authority to the contrary. He cites to the ABA Guidelines'
qualification requirements, but cites nothing to demonstrate that they have become
constitutionalized. Appellant's Brief at 31. 18
As to Utah R. Crim. P. 8?s qualification requirements for appointing counsel to represent
persons facing a death sentence, Lafferty fails to acknowledge that the rule's plain language
precludes founding an ineffective assistance claim on the failure to comply with the rule's
qualification provisions. Utah R. Crim. P. 8(f).
18

The Supreme Court has looked to the ABA Guidelines on counsel's duties, as
opposed to the guidelines on their qualifications, in assessing whether counsel fulfilled
their constitutional duties. However, even in making that assessment, the Supreme Court
has looked to the ABA Guidelines only as one factor in determining whether the
representation met constitutional standards. As the post-conviction court recognized (R.
444-42,440-38), the Supreme Court expressly refused to adopt them as a "particular set
of detailed rules for counsel's conduct." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 546-47 (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 688-89).
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Finally, Lafferty asserts that "there is a reason behind having qualified attorneys
represent [a] death penalty client" and refers to his challenge to counsel's mitigation
investigation and presentation. Appellant's Brief at 32. As demonstrated above, the penaltyphase ineffective-assistance claim is frivolous because Lafferty's trial counsel presented all
the material mitigation evidence that Lafferty claims that they should have presented. Thus,
Lafferty asks the Court to set aside his death sentence based on an assertion that counsel did
not have the requisite qualifications even though they did all that Lafferty contends that they
should have done.
The Court may affirm on the alternative basis that Lafferty never proffered evidence to
support the factual predicate for his claim that counsel did not meet ABA and rule 8
qualification requirements. See, e.g., Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58 ^flO. Lafferty alleged in
the Second Amended Petition that, "on information and belief," counsel did not have the ABA
and rule 8 qualifications to represent him. However, Lafferty was not entitled to rely on his
belief to oppose summary judgment. He had to present his "best showing" by sworn testimony
that counsel did not meet the ABA and rule 8 qualifications. Brandt v. Springville Banking
Co., 353 P.2d at 462; Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (party opposing summary judgment must support
his factual assertions with affidavits or discovery responses; he may not rely on mere
allegations). He did not. Because he failed to demonstrate that a factual issue existed on the
predicate for his claim, the post-conviction court correctly granted summary judgment on it.19
19

Lafferty asserts that the post-conviction court "seem[ed]" to accept that counsel
did not have the qualifications delineated in the ABA Guidelines and rule 8. Appellant's
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E.

This Court's direct-appeal decision forecloses Lafferty's claim that his trial
counsel should have objected to the prosecutor's closing argument about killing
a fifteen-month-old girl.
On direct appeal, Lafferty claimed that the prosecutor improperly argued that killing

fifteen-month-old Erica supported a death sentence. This Court rejected the argument, holding
that it neither called the jury's attention to matters that it should not consider in imposing
sentence nor prejudiced Lafferty. State v. Lafferty, 2001 UTffif86-87, 89-93. Although the
Court noted that Lafferty did not preserve the argument, the Court did not found its decision
on the lack of preservation. Id. That is, the Court did not affirm because the prosecutor made
an erroneous and prejudicial argument that was not obviously erroneous.
Nevertheless, Lafferty asked for post-conviction relief because his trial counsel's failure
to object to the prosecutor's argument limited this Court's direct-appeal review to plain error
(R. 215). The post-conviction court correctly rejected Lafferty's claim. Even if trial counsel
had objected to the prosecutor's argument, Lafferty still would have had to convince this Court
that 1) the prosecutor called to the jury's attention matters that it should not consider in
imposing sentence; and 2) absent the prosecutor's improper statements, there would exist a
Brief at 32. The post-conviction court merely concluded that, even if counsel did not
have the ABA and rule 8 qualifications, the claim failed as a matter of law; the court did
not conclude that counsel in fact did not have those qualifications (R. 444-42, 440-38).
Lafferty continues that "[i]n fact, it is clear that trial counsel did not meet the criteria
necessary to qualify to defend capital cases." Appellant's Brief at 32. However, he
provides no record citation demonstrating where that is clear. The only record reference
is Lafferty's unsupported allegation "on information and belief that counsel did not meet
the ABA and rule 8 qualifications. As demonstrated, "information and belief
unsupported by proffered evidence is insufficient to withstand a summary judgment
motion.
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reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result. See State v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342, 2001 UT
19ffi[86-87,cert denied, 534 U.S. 1018 (2001). This court rejected Lafferty's direct appeal
argument on those two elements. Trial counsel's failure to preserve the claim did not affect
the appellate outcome; therefore, Lafferty's ineffective-assistance claim failed as a matter of
law. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 695 (to prove ineffective assistance of
counsel petitioner must prove, in part, that any constitutionally deficient performance
undermines confidence in the outcome of his trial); Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96, ^48, 44
P.3d 626 (to prove ineffective assistance of appellate counsel a post-conviction petitioner must
prove, in part, that the overlooked claim probably would have resulted in reversal).20
F.

Lafferty proffered no evidence that his appellate counsel overlooked an obvious
appellate challenge that probably would have succeeded based on the trial court's
denial of his motion to change venue.
Lafferty claimed that his appellate counsel should have sought reversal because the trial

court did not change his trial's venue (R. 215-14). The post-conviction granted summary
judgment on this claim because Lafferty "ha[d] not pointed to any specific evidence that any
juror was biased" (R. 441-40).
On appeal, Lafferty asserts that he met all of the State v. James, 767 P.2d 549 (Utah
1989), factors for assessing a motion to change venue: 1) the defendant's and his victims'

20

Lafferty also states that, even if the single incident of alleged prosecutorial
misconduct did not rise to the "Strickland standard," the "cumulative evidence of the
misconduct does rise to the Strickland level." Appellant's Brief at 33. However, Lafferty
limited his claim to the allegation addressed in the text. He alleged below and identifies
here no additional misconduct to accumulate in support of a cumulative error claim.
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community standing; 2) the community's size; 3) the offense's nature and gravity; and 4) the
nature and gravity of any publicity. From that assertion, he concludes that he was prejudiced
"by having a tainted jury pool." Appellant's Brief at 33.
Lafferty's reliance on James fails to demonstrate reversible error. First, Lafferty cites
no case decided at the time of his second direct appeal, and the State knows of none, where this
Court applied the James factors in assessing a denied venue-change motion in a post-trial,
plenary appeal.21
Second, even if the James factors applied, Lafferty has not demonstrated that he
satisfied them. On appeal, he asserts without any record citation that "[s]urely" he met all four.
However, he offered no evidence to establish his or the victim's standing in the community,
the community's size, his reputation in the community, or the amount of pre-trial publicity

21

The State recognizes that, over four and one-half years after Lafferty's second
direct appeal concluded, this Court held that the James factors may help evaluate the
relevant issue in a post-trial, plenary appeal challenge to a denied venue-change motion:
whether a biased jury tried the defendant. State v. Stubbs, 123 P.3d 407, 2006 UT 65.
However, Lafferty has not and cannoi rely on Stubbs to support his ineffective assistance
claim. First it was not available to appellate counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. at 689; Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d at 1052. Second, as detailed in the text, Lafferty
offered no proof on the James factors. Third, the Court reaffirmed that the relevant
inquiry in a plenary-appeal review of a denied motion to change venue was whether a
biased jury tried the defendant. The Court held only that the James factors "can be
helpful in assessing the overall fairness of the jury pool." State v. Stubbs, 2006 UT 65 f
17. Nevertheless, the Court then relied in Stubbs on the jurors' actual voir dire answers to
conclude that the entire jury pool was so tainted that the trial court "probably" could not
impanel an impartial jury; the Court did not rely on the predictive James factors. Id. at f
18. Lafferty cites to nothing of similar ilk in the voir dire of his jury pool.
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associated with his second trial. Appellant's Brief at 33-34.22
Moreover, on Lafferty's first direct appeal, his counsel - the same counsel who
represented him on his second direct appeal - did raise a claim based on the denied motion to
change the first trial's venue. In Lafferty's first direct appeal, this Court rejected that claim
because 1) the jurors' voir dire responses in Lafferty's first trial demonstrated no bias; and 2)
the totality of the circumstances provided no basis for concluding that the trial court should not
have trusted the jurors' assurances of impartiality. State v. Lafferty, 794 P.2d at 1250-51.
Lafferty cites no law or facts demonstrating that things had changed so dramatically between
his first and second trials that his counsel should have pursued an appellate challenge based
on the denied venue-change motion after having lost a similar challenge in his first direct
appeal.23
In sum, even after Lafferty was required to make his "best showing," it was insufficient
to create a material fact issue on any of his ineffective assistance claims. The post-conviction
court correctly concluded that Lafferty's allegations and summary judgment proffer were
insufficient as a matter of law to overcome the presumption of constitutionally sufficient
representation or to demonstrate prejudice.

22

The State concedes that the offense's gravity and nature were extreme.

23

Although Lafferty claimed that his appellate counsel should have challenged the
denial of his venue-change motion, he asserts in his brief that counsel "failed to request a
change of venue." Appellant's Brief at 34. However, the criminal case docket has an
entry for a June 30, 1994, motion to change venue.
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POINT V
BECAUSE
LAFFERTY
PROFFERED
NO
EVIDENCE
DEMONSTRATING THAT HIS TRIAL COUNSEL SUBVERTED HIS
INTERESTS TO PROMOTE HIS BROTHER'S, THE POSTCONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON HIS CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST CLAIM
Lafferty claimed that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel
because his trial counsel previously had represented his brother and co-defendant Dan (R. 208).
The undisputed facts established that Dan's case concluded eleven years before the State
retried Lafferty. Trial counsel called Dan to testify at Lafferty's retrial that Dan, not Lafferty,
physically committed both murders. (R. 257-56, 375-73, 433-31.) In the post-conviction
court, Lafferty alleged no additional facts and, in response to the summary judgment motion,
proffered no additional evidence (R. 337-36).
To demonstrate a conflict of interest that infringed his constitutional rights, Lafferty had
to establish both: 1) an actual conflict of interest; and 2) that the conflict adversely affected
counsel's performance. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 692; Edens v.
Hannigan, 87 F.3d 1109, 1114 (10th Cir. 1996); State v. Lovell, 984 P.2d 382, 387, 1999 UT
40 \ 22, cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1083 (2000); State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 686 (Utah 1997),
cert, denied, 525 U.S. 833 (1998). To demonstrate an actual conflict of interest, Lafferty had
to prove that trial counsel was forced to make choices that advanced Dan's interests to the
detriment of Lafferty's. See United States v. Alvarez, 137 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 1998);
State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d at 686. To demonstrate that a Sixth Amendment conflict adversely
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affected trial counsel's performance, Lafferty had to prove that trial counsel actually
compromised Lafferty's interests for Dan's benefit. United States v. Alvarez, 137 F.3d at
1252; State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 401J22.
By the time trial counsel represented Lafferty on his retrial, Dan had already been tried,
convicted, and sentenced. It does not appear that Dan appealed his conviction or sentence.
Thus, the evidence presented to the post-conviction court indicated that trial counsel's
representation of Dan ended before his representation of Lafferty began. See Gardner v.
Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 620 (Utah 1994) (no constitutional conflict where appellate counsel
previously represented Gardner's co-defendant because, "by the time [counsel] was appointed
to represent Gardner, the charges against [his co-defendant] were concluded, and a conflict,
potential or otherwise, no longer existed between the two defendants"), cert, denied, 516 U.S.
828(1995).24
On appeal, Lafferty contends that the State never proved when or if counsel withdrew
from representing Dan. Appellant's Brief at 36-37. Lafferty misses the point. Lafferty, not
the State, has the burden of proof. Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-105 (West 2004). Lafferty had
to make his "best showing" that his trial counsel had a continuing duty to Dan. He made no

24

Lafferty purports to distinguish Gardner because Gardner's accomplice played a
much more minor role. He continues that Dan confessed to killing Erica. Appellant's
Brief at 37-38. Lafferty relies on distinctions that make no difference. The point in
Gardner was that Gardner's co-defendant's case had concluded; therefore, she had no
ongoing interest that Gardner's appellate attorney could advance at Gardner's expense.
Lafferty, who has the burden of proof, has never demonstrated that Dan had any ongoing
interest that Lafferty's counsel could advance at Lafferty's expense. Gardner is on point.
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showing that such a duty existed.25
More fundamentally, Lafferty proffered no proof on the critical issue: whether Dan had
an ongoing interest that Lafferty's counsel could advance at Lafferty's expense. To the
contrary, at Lafferty's retrial, counsel called Dan to testify and accept full responsibility for
physically committing both murders. State v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342,2001 UT 19 *f 15 n.8, cert
denied, 534 U.S. 1018 (2001). Counsel relied on Dan's testimony to argue against imposing
a death sentence on Lafferty. That is, she argued that Lafferty was an accomplice to a murder
that Dan committed, and that, because Dan received a life sentence, it would be unfair to
sentence Lafferty to death. (R. 269-68.) If counsel had any ongoing duty to Dan, which
Lafferty has never attempted to establish, he certainly did not elevate it over his duty to
Lafferty.26
25

Lafferty states that Dan still had appellate and post-conviction remedies available
when trial counsel represented Lafferty on the retrial. The first allegation is false. The
retrial proceedings did not begin until 1992. Dan's right to appeal expired in 1985.
The second allegation is misleading. Even if Dan still had post-conviction
remedies available, nothing in the record demonstrates that Dan's trial counsel would
have represented him in those proceedings. To the contrary, trial counsel generally do not
represent their former clients in post-conviction proceedings because, in those
proceedings, their former clients usually claim that their trial counsel violated their
constitutional duty to them. Indeed, the PCRA prohibits appointing trial counsel to
represent their former clients in the post-conviction proceedings. Utah Code Ann. § 7835a-109(l) (West 2004).
26

0n appeal, Lafferty relies heavily on Utah R. Prof. Conduct. 1.9 to argue that his
trial counsel had a conflict of interest. Even if counsel technically violated rule 1.9,
which the State does not concede, that violation would not demonstrate &per se
constitutional conflict. United States v. Gallegos, 39 F.3d 276, 279 (10th Cir. 1994) ("a
violation of [disciplinary rules] will not in itself constitute a constitutional violation").
Moreover, rule 1.9 is violated only when the two clients have "materially adverse."
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons argued, the post-conviction court correctly concluded that all of
Lafferty's post-conviction claims failed as a matter of law on the undisputed facts. The court
correctly granted summary judgment on all of Lafferty's post-conviction claims. This Court
should affirm that order and the consequent denial of post-conviction relief.
DATED November 9, 2006.
MARK SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

THOMAS B. BRUNKER
CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD
Assistant Attorneys General
Appellee's counsel

interests. Lafferty contends that there was a "naturally adverse relationship" because he
and Dan were charged as co-defendants. Clearly, Lafferty's and Dan's interests would
have been "materially adverse" if each had attempted to exculpate himself at the other's
expense. However, Lafferty proffered no evidence demonstrating such a conflict. As
demonstrated in the text, it appears from the undisputed facts that none existed.
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Addenda

Addendum A

UTST§ 78-35a-104
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-104

Page 1

c
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART IV. Particular Proceedings
CHAPTER 35a. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
78-35a-104 Grounds for relief —Retroactivity of rule.

(1) Unless precluded by Section 78-35a-106 or 78-35a-107, a person who has been
convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the district
court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the
conviction or sentence upon the following grounds:

(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of the
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution;

(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is in violation of the
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which the
petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected;

(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, or probation was revoked in
an unlawful manner;

(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; or

(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate
the conviction or sentence, because:

(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at
the time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any
previously filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the
evidence could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable
diligence;

(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was
known;

(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and

(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material
evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the
petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence received.

(2) The question of whether a petitioner

is entitled to the benefit

Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

of a rule

UTST§ 78-35a-104
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-104
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announced by the United States Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah Court of
Appeals after the petitioner's conviction became final shall be governed by
applicable state and federal principles of retroactivity.

History: C. 1953, 78-35a-104, enacted by L. 1996, ch. 235, § 4.
U.C.A. 1953 §

78-35a-104, UT ST §

78-35a-104

Current through 2003 First Special Session
Copyright ©

2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the
of the LexisNexis Group.
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78. Judicial Code
Part IV. Particular Proceedings
K
M Chapter 35A. Post-conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)
*3 Part 1. General Provisions
•+§
(1)

(2)

(3)

78-35a-105. Burden of proof

Except as provided in 78-35a-104(1)(f), ^the petitioner has the burden of
pleading and proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts
necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief.
If the State fails to respond to a petition, the court shall not enter a
default judgment.
Instead, the court shall proceed to the petition's
merits and assess
the post-conviction claims in light of the entire
record, including the record from the criminal case under review.
The respondent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under
Section 78-35a-106, but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has
the burden to disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.

Laws 1996, c. 235, §
U.C.A. 1953 §

5, eff. April 29, 1996.

78-35a-105, UT ST §

78-35a-105

Current through end of 2006 Third Special Session

Copr ©

2006 Thomson/West

END OF DOCUMENT
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UT ST § 78-35a-106
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-106

c
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART IV. Particular Proceedings
CHAPTER 35a. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
78-35a-106 Preclusion of relief —Exception.

(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that:

(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;

(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;

(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;

(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief
or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for postconviction relief; or

(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107.

(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a
basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if
the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel.

History: C. 1953, 78-35a-106, enacted by L. 1996, ch. 235, §

U.C.A. 1953 §

78-35a-106, UT ST §

6.

78-35a-106

Current through 2003 First Special Session

Copyright ©

2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the

of the LexisNexis Group.
END OF DOCUMENT
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c
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART IV. Particular Proceedings
CHAPTER 35a. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
78-35a-109 Appointment of counsel.

(1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may, upon
the request of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis. Counsel
who represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal may not be
appointed to represent the petitioner under this section.

(2) In determining
following factors:

whether

(a) whether the petition
evidentiary hearing; and

to

appoint

contains

counsel,

factual

the

court

allegations

shall

consider

the

that will require

(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of
require the assistance of counsel for proper adjudication.

law

or

fact

an

that

(3) An allegation that counsel appointed under this section was ineffective cannot
be the basis for relief in any subsequent post-conviction petition.

History: C. 1953, 78-35a-109, enacted by L. 1996, ch. 235, §

U.C.A. 1953 §

78-35a-109, UT ST §

9.

78-35a-109

Current through 2003 First Special Session

Copyright ©

2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the

of the LexisNexis Group.
END OF DOCUMENT
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c
West's Utah Court Rules Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos)
K

M Part VIII.

Provisional and Final Remedies and Special Proceedings

-•RULE 65C. POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
(a) Scope.
This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for postconviction relief filed under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 et seq., Post-Conviction
Remedies Act.
(b) Commencement and Venue.
The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a
petition with the clerk of the district court in the county in which the judgment
of conviction was entered.
The petition should be filed on forms provided by the
court. The court may order a change of venue on its own motion if the petition is
filed in the wrong county.
The court may order a change of venue on motion of a
party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses.
(c) Contents of the Petition.
petitioner has in relation to
Additional claims relating to the
raised in subsequent proceedings
state:

The petition shall set forth all claims that the
the legality of the conviction or sentence.
legality of the conviction or sentence may not be
except for good cause shown.
The petition shall

(1) whether
incarceration;

is

the

petitioner

incarcerated

and,

if

so,

the

place

of

(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and
the dates of proceedings in which the conviction was entered, together with the
court f s case number for those proceedings, if known by the petitioner;
(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that
p e t i t i o n e e s claim to relief;

form the basis

of the

(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for
violation of probation has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and
title of the appellate proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the results of
the appeal;
(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in
any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and, if so, the case number
and title of those proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the results
of the prior proceeding; and
(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered
evidence, the reasons why the evidence could not have been discovered in time for
the claim to be addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous post-conviction
petition.
(d) Attachments to the Petition.
shall attach to the petition:
©

If available to the petitioner, the petitioner

2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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(1) affidavits,
allegations;

copies

of

records

and

other

evidence

in

support

(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court
the direct appeal of the petitioner's case;

of

the

regarding

(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction
or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the conviction or
sentence;
and
(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court.
(e) Memorandum of Authorities.
The petitioner shall not set forth argument or
citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a
separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the petition.
(f) Assignment.
On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign
and deliver it to the judge who sentenced the petitioner.
If the judge who
sentenced the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case in the
normal course.

(g)(1) Summary Dismissal
of
Claims.
The assigned judge shall review the
petition, and, if it is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated
in a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its
face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating either
that the claim has been adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its face.
The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall
terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal.
The order of dismissal need
not recite findings of fact or conclusions of law.
(2) A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations
contained in the pleadings and attachments, it appears that:
(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law;
(B) the claims have no arguable basis in fact;

or

(C) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired prior
to the filing of the petition.
(3) If a
error or
return a
grant one

petition is not frivolous on its face but
failure to comply with the requirements
copy of the petition with leave to amend
additional 20 day period to amend for good

is deficient due to a pleading
of this rule, the court shall
within 20 days. The court may
cause shown.

(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-conviction
petition in a case where the petitioner is sentenced to death.
(h) Service of Petitions.
If, on review of the petition, the court concludes
that all or part of the petition should not be summarily dismissed, the court shall
designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the clerk
to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and memorandum by mail upon the
respondent. If the petition is a challenge to a felony conviction or sentence, the
respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney General. In all other
cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner.
©
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(i) Answer or Other Response.
Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these
rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the
respondent, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the
respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition that
have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response upon the
petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus time allowed for
service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary judgment,
the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the motion.
No further pleadings or
amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the court.
(j) Hearings.
After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the
proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case.
The court may also
order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay
unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition.
At the prehearing
conference, the court may:
(1) consider the formation and simplification of issues;
(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents;

and

(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be
presented at the evidentiary hearing.
(k) Presence of the Petitioner at Hearings. The petitioner shall be present at
the prehearing conference if the petitioner is not represented by counsel.
The
prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or video conferencing.
The petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on dispositive issues
but need not otherwise be present in court during the proceeding.
The court may
conduct any hearing at the correctional facility where the petitioner is confined.
(1) Discovery; Records. Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed by
the court upon motion of a party and a determination that there is good cause to
believe that discovery is necessary to provide a party with evidence that is likely
to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing.
The court may order either the
petitioner or the respondent to obtain any relevant transcript or court records.
(m) Orders;

Stay.

(1) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter
findings of fact and conclusions of law and an appropriate order.
If the
petitioner is serving a sentence for a felony conviction, the order shall be stayed
for 5 days.
Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written notice to
the court and the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new trial, pursue a
new sentence, appeal the order, or take no action.
Thereafter the stay of the
order is governed by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will
be taken, the stay shall expire and the court shall deliver forthwith to the
custodian of the petitioner the order to release the petitioner.
(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or
resentenced, the trial court may enter any supplementary orders as to arraignment,
trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may be necessary
and proper.

©
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(n) Costs.
The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under
Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate.
If the petitioner is indigent,
the court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental entity that
prosecuted the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody of the Department of
Corrections, Section 64-13-23 and Sections 21-7-3 through 21-7- 4.7 govern the
manner and procedure by which the trial court shall determine the amount, if any,
to charge for fees and costs.
(o) Appeal.
Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be
appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah in
accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts.
[Adopted effective July 1, 1996.]
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule replaces former paragraph (b) of Rule 65B.
It governs proceedings
challenging a conviction or sentence, regardless whether the claim relates to an
original commitment, a commitment for violation of probation, or a sentence other
than commitment.
Claims relating to the terms or conditions of confinement are
governed by paragraph (b) of the Rule 65B.
This rule, as a general matter,
simplifies the pleading requirements and contains two significant changes from
procedure under the former rule. First, the paragraph requires the clerk of court
to assign post-conviction relief to the judge who sentenced the petitioner if that
judge is available. Second, the rule allows the court to dismiss frivolous claims
before any answer or other response is required. This provision is patterned after
the federal practice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The advisory committee adopted
the summary procedures set forth as a means of balancing the requirements of
fairness and due process on the one hand against the public f s interest in the
efficient adjudication of the enormous volume of post-conviction relief cases.
The requirement in paragraph (1) for a determination that discovery is necessary to
discover relevant evidence that is likely to be admissible at an evidentiary
hearing is a higher standard than is normally used determining motions for
discovery.
Rules Civ. P r o c , Rule 65C, UT R RCP Rule 65C
Current with amendments effective November 1, 2004
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UT ADC R25-14
U.A.C. R25-14
Utah Admin. R. 25-14
UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
R25. FINANCE.
Current through July 1, 2001.
R25-14. Payment of Attorneys Fees in Death Penalty Cases.
R25-14-1. Authority and Purpose.
(1) This rule is implemented pursuant to Section 78-35a-202.
(2) The purpose of the rule is to establish the procedures and
maximum compensation amounts to be paid for attorneys fees and
litigation expenses by the Division of Finance to legal counsel
appointed by district courts to represent
indigent
persons
sentenced to death who request representation to file an action
under Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction Remedies Act.
R25-14-2. Request for Payment.
In order to obtain payment for attorney's fees and litigation
expenses, counsel appointed by a district court, pursuant to
Section 78-35a-202(2)(c), shall present to the Division of
Finance
a certified
copy
of the district
court
order
of
appointment of legal counsel and a signed Request for Payment
verifying the work has been performed as provided in Section R2514-4 pursuant to the schedule of payments set forth in that
section.
R25-14-3. Scope of Services.
(1) All appointed counsel, by accepting the court appointment
to represent an indigent client sentenced to death and by
presenting a Request for Payment to the Division of Finance,
agree to provide all reasonable and necessary post- conviction
legal services for the client, including timely filing an action
under the provisions of Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction
Remedies Act and representing the client in all legal proceedings
conducted thereafter including, if requested by the client, an
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.
(2) All appointed counsel agree to accept as full compensation
for the legal services performed and litigation costs incurred
the amounts provided in the Schedule of Payments of Attorneys
Fees found in Section R25-14-4.
R25-14-4. Schedule of Payments of Attorneys Fees.

All counsel appointed to jointly represent a single client
shall be paid, in the aggregate, according to the following
schedule of payments upon certification to the Division of
Finance that the specified legal service was performed or the
specified events have occurred:
(1) $5,000.00 upon appointment by the district court and
presentation of a signed Request for Payment to the Division of
Finance.
(2) $5,000.00 upon timely filing a petition for post-conviction
relief.
(3) $10,000.00 after all discovery has been completed, all
prehearing motions have been ruled upon, and a date for an
evidentiary hearing has been set.
(4) If an evidentiary hearing is required, $5,000.00 on the
date the first witness is sworn.
(5) $7,500.00 if an appeal is filed from a final order of the
district court. $5,000.00 of the total shall be paid when the
brief on behalf of the indigent person is filed and $2,500.00
when the Utah Supreme Court finally remits the case to the
district court.
(6) An additional fee of $100 per hour, but in no event to
exceed $5,000.00 in the aggregate, shall be paid if:
(a) counsel satisfy the requirements of Rule 4-505, Utah Code
of Judicial Administration; and
(b) the district court finds:
(i) that the appointed counsel provided extraordinary legal
services that were not reasonably foreseeable at the time of
accepting the appointment, such as responding to or filing a
petition for interlocutory appeal, and
(ii) the services were both reasonable and necessary for the
presentation of the client!s claims.
(c) These additional fees shall be paid upon approval by the
district court and compliance with the provisions of this rule.
R25-14-5. Payment of Reasonable Litigation Expenses.
The Division of Finance shall pay reasonable litigation
expenses not to exceed a total of $20,000.00 in any one case for
court approved investigators, expert witnesses, and consultants.
Before payment is made for litigation expenses, the appointed

counsel must submit a request for payment to the Division of
Finance including:
(1) a detailed invoice of all expenses for which payment is
requested; and
(2) written approval of the district court certifying that the
expenses were both reasonable and necessary for the presentation
of the client's claims.
R25-14-6. Withdrawal of Counsel.
(1) If an attorney appointed under Section
permitted to withdraw by the court or, due
disability, is unable to continue, the attorney
only for the actual work performed to the date of
certified by the court.

78-35a-202 is
to death or
shall be paid
withdrawal as

(2) If withdrawal is ordered by the court because of counsel's
improper conduct or the court finds that a foreseeable conflict
of interest which should have been disclosed prior to appointment
existed, all compensation received by the attorney shall be
repaid to the Division of Finance.
KEY: attorneys, fees, capital punishment, post-conviction*
January 22, 2001
78-35a-202
UT ADC R25-14
END OF DOCUMENT
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Assistant Attorneys General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, #4666
Utah Attorney General
Heber Wells Bldg.
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
Respondent's counsel
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY,

v.

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING
PETITION FOR POST
CONVICTION RELIEF, AND
JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT

STATE OF UTAH,

JUDGE ANTHONY SCHOFIELD

Petitioner,

Case No. 020404472

Respondent.

Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and for Partial Summary
Judgment is before the Court.
motion.

The parties have fully briefed the

On October 6, 2005, the Court heard argument on the

motion, during which Thomas Brunker and Christopher Ballard
represented the State, and Aric Cramer and Grant W.P. Morrison
represented petitioner.

Petitioner was present in Court.

On

November 29, 2005, the Court entered its Ruling on Motion to

O 0in
u

Dismiss and for Partial Summary Judgment ("Ruling").

Based on

the papers filed, the arguments presented, and the Court's
Ruling, which is incorporated into this order by reference;
because petitioner has failed to "set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," as required by
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); and because it appears that there is good
cause for doing so,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

The State's summary judgment motion is GRANTED as to all

of petitioner's post-conviction claims.

Petitioner's Second

Amended Writ of Habeas Corpus, Part I, and Petition For Writ of
Habeas Corpus are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and the Court DENIES
post-conviction relief on both petitions.

2

2.
DATED

The Court orders judgment entered in the State's favor,
I "?~0v

.
BY THE COURT:

ANTHONY^JSC^

.>.a"l*>*^

'l>

0

Fourth D i s t r i c t C o u r ^ T J y ^ ^ ^ / ^
Approved as to form:
•v.

vric Cramer
CRAMER, CRAMER & ADAIR, L.L.C,
Grant W.P. Morrison
MORRISON & MORRISON
Petitioner's counsel.

3

deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY,

CASE NUMBER: 020404472

Petitioner,

DATED: NOVEMBER 29, 2005

vs.

RULING ON MOTION TO
DISMISS AND FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Respondent.

ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE

STATE OF UTAH,

This case is before the court on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and for Partial Summary
Judgment. Having thoroughly reviewed the parties' memoranda, relevant case law, previous
rulings in the case, and all applicable statutory provisions, and having considered the oral
arguments presented by counsel at the hearing held October 6, 2005,1 now issue this ruling
granting Respondent's motion.
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Following a jury trial in May 1985, Petitioner was convicted of two counts of first degree
murder, two counts of aggravated burglary, and two counts of conspiracy to commit first degree
murder. Pursuant to statute, a sentencing hearing was convened after which the jury returned a
verdict of death on each of the first degree murder convictions. Petitioner subsequently appealed
his conviction and death sentence to the Utah Supreme Court. On January 11, 1988, the Court
issued its decision rejecting all of Petitioner's challenges. See State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239
(Utah 1988) {Lafferty I), Petitioner did not seek state collateral review of his conviction and
sentence, but opted instead to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District
Court for the District of Utah. This petition was denied by the federal district court and
Petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth
Circuit Court reversed the district court and granted Petitioner's writ of habeas corpus, thereby
vacating his conviction and sentence. It concluded that the state trial court had relied upon an
incorrect legal standard in evaluating Petitioner's competency. See Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d
1546 (10th Cir. 1991).
Respondent thereafter chose to retry Petitioner for the offenses originally charged against
him. In April 1996, Petitioner was again convicted of two counts of first degree murder, two
counts of aggravated burglary, and two counts of conspiracy to commit first degree murder.
Following a sentencing hearing, the jury returned verdicts of death on each of the first degree
murder convictions. Petitioner then appealed his conviction and death sentence to the Utah
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence, see State v.
Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, 20 P.3d 342 {Lafferty II). The United States Supreme Court denied
1

review. See Lafferty v. Utah, 534 U.S. 1018(2001).
On October 10, 2002, Petitioner filed his Preliminary Petition for Habeas Corpus and/or
Post-Conviction Relief in this court. On October 29, 2004, Petitioner filed his Second Amended
Writ of Habeas Corpus, Parts 1 and 2, raising numerous claims challenging his conviction and
death sentence. In response, on February 23, 2005, Respondent filed the motion now at issue.
Petitioner filed his opposition to the motion on May 16, 2005. On June 20, 2005, Respondent
filed its reply. On October 6, 2005, the court received oral argument on the motion.

SUMMARY OF THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS
Petitioner's second amended petition first raises a claim for relief based upon newly
discovered evidence. Petitioner asserts that he has new evidence of perjury or inconsistent
testimony by Dr. Stephen Golding, who was one of the forensic psychologists that evaluated
Petitioner as part of the competency determination. According to Petitioner, during his
competency hearings, Dr. Golding specifically stated that Petitioner could be found "situationally
competent," that is, competent in some situations, but not competent in others. However, in
recent competency hearings held in the case of State v. Brian Mitchell, case no. 031901884 (3rd
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah), Petitioner claims that Dr. Golding testified that
situational competence is not a viable diagnosis.
Additionally, Petitioner also raises forty-seven separate claims challenging the legality of
his conviction and the sentence of death imposed upon him. These claims include (1) error by
the trial court in denying the motion for change of venue; (2) errors committed during the jury
selection process; (3) errors concerning the penalty phase jury instructions and verdict forms; (4)
2

errors committed by the trial court with respect to the admission of evidence; (5) challenges to
Utah's capital decision-making process; (6) error committed by the trial court in finding that
Petitioner was competent to proceed; (7) error committed by the trial court in failing to sequester
the jury; and (8) cumulative error. In addition, Petitioner raises several claims of ineffective
assistance of both trial counsel and appellate counsel. These ineffectiveness claims generally
challenge the qualifications of both trial and appellate counsel. Moreover, there is also an
ineffectiveness claim challenging the qualifications of post-conviction counsel.
Based upon the claims he raises, Petitioner asks that I grant him sufficient funds to pay
for counsel and to hire necessary and appropriate experts and investigators to prepare for an
evidentiary hearing on these issues and that I thereafter conduct a hearing to allow him to present
evidence in support of his contentions. Ultimately, he desires that I "[ajllow a Writ of Habeas
corpus to have the Petitioner brought before the Court so he might be discharged from his illegal
and unconstitutional confinement and restraint, and/or relieved of his illegal and unconstitutional
sentence of death." Second Am. Pet. at 25.
In addition to the foregoing claims, Petitioner requested counsel to attach a Second
Amended Writ of Habeas Corpus Part 2, apparently written by Mr. Lafferty himself, in which he
raises the following claims: (1) evidence was planted at the trial proceedings by the prosecution;
(2) his second trial violated his protection against double jeopardy; (3) after the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals vacated Petitioner's first conviction and death sentence, Respondent failed to
arrest, re-charge, or properly arraign him on the current charges; and (4) his counsel erroneously
advised him not to file a 120-day disposition request. Based upon these claims, Petitioner
requests the court to immediately release him from custody and order monetary relief and redress
3

in the amount of thirty-five million dollars.
Respondent argues that summary judgment is appropriate on all of Petitioner's claims.
According to Respondent, many of Petitioner's claims are procedurally barred pursuant to the
Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) because they either were previously raised and rejected
on direct appeal or they are claims that could have been raised on direct appeal, but were not.
With respect to the other claims, Respondent contends that Petitioner has failed to plead or
establish the existence of sufficient facts to support the claims and to grant him sufficient funds
to pay for counsel and hire the necessary and appropriate experts and investigators .

LEGAL ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Utah Supreme Court has held that,
[i]t is not the purpose of the summary judgment procedure to judge the credibility
of the averments of parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evidence. Neither is it
to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is
to eliminate the time, trouble^] and expense of trial when upon any view taken of
the facts as asserted by the party ruled against, he would not be entitled to prevail.
Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). Indeed, any showing in support of
summary judgment "must preclude all reasonable possibility that the loser could, if given a trial,
produce evidence which would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor." Bullock v. Deseret
Dodge Truck Ctr., 354 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah 1960). See also Burningham v. Ott, 525 P.2d 620,
621 (Utah 1974) (same). "Only when it so appears, is the court justified in refusing such a party
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the opportunity of presenting his evidence and attempting to persuade the fact trier to his views."
Holbrook, 542 P.2d at 193. However, if the party moving for summary judgment satisfies his
burden of "informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying the portions of the
pleadings or supporting documents which it believes demonstrates an absence of a genuine issue
of material fact," TS1 Partnership v. Alfred, 877 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), then the
opposing party cannot simply "rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his
response ,. . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial If he
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him." Utah R.
Civ. P. 56(e).
In considering a motion for summary judgment in the context of a petition for postconviction relief, the court is obligated to bear in mind that a "petition for post-conviction relief.
.. collaterally attacks a conviction and/or a sentence. It is not a substitute for direct appellate
review." Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1994). Thus, "[i]ssues raised and
disposed of on direct appeal of a conviction or a sentence cannot properly be raised again in a
[post-conviction petition] and should be dismissed as an abuse of the writ without a ruling on the
merits." Id. See also Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(b). In addition, "issues that could and
should have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, may not be raised for the first time in a
[post-conviction] proceeding," Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96, f6, 44 P.3d 626 {Carter I), unless
the petitioner can demonstrate that "the failure to raise [these issues] was due to ineffective
assistance of counsel." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(2). Finally, when claims of newly
discovered evidence are raised, relief can be granted only if the petitioner, or his counsel, was
not, and could not have been, aware of the evidence at the time of trial or sentencing and it can
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be shown that the new evidence is not merely cumulative, is not simply impeachment evidence,
and that, when all the other evidence is taken into consideration, no reasonable trier of fact could
have found the petitioner guilty of first degree murder or returned a verdict in favor of the death
penalty. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(l)(e)(i)-(iv).
With respect to Petitioner's claims that allege ineffective assistance of trial counsel, in
order to prevail he must demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to
each prong of the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): (1) that
counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient and (2) that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. Id. at 686. See also Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988) (to
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, "a defendant must show, first, that his
counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment and, second, that counsel's
performance prejudiced the defendant."); State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985) (to show
ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must prove "(1) that his counsel rendered a
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the outcome of the trial would
probably have been different but for counsel's error."). However, as the Supreme Court noted in
Strickland, "counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance," Strickland, 466
U.S. at 690, 696, and there is also a strong presumption that the outcome of the particular
proceeding is reliable.
Under the first prong of the test, an attorney's performance is deficient if he has "made
errors so serious that [he] was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed [a] defendant by the
Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687. The seriousness of any errors is judged by whether counsel's
6

representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 688. In this context,
the "reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the
defendant's own statements or actions. Counsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on
informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant."
Id. at 691. But see Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2466-68 (2005) (holding that even if a
defendant suggests that no mitigating evidence is available, trial counsel is required to review
material he knows the prosecutor will rely on as evidence in aggravation).
In challenging counsel's effectiveness, a petitioner "must identify the acts or omissions of
counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. The
court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or
omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Id. at 690. In
making this determination, fairness requires "that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting
effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to
evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Id. at 689. Moreover, the
assessment of counsel's performance cannot be based upon "what is prudent or appropriate, but
only [upon] what is constitutionally compelled." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665 n.38
(1984). In addition, the Supreme Court has specifically noted that,
judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. . . .
Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge
a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action "might be
considered sound trial strategy."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
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Concerning the second prong of the test, even if an attorney's representation is found to
be unreasonable under prevailing professional norms, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
will nevertheless fail if the errors committed by counsel had no effect on the outcome of the
criminal proceeding. Id. at 691. Thus,
[it] is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable
effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Virtually every act or omission of
counsel would meet that test and not every error that conceivably could have
influenced the outcome undermines the reliability of the result of the proceeding.
Id. at 693. A petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."1 Id. at
694.
The United States Supreme Court has also held that the effective assistance of appellate
counsel is a right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Evitts v.
Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985). Whether an appellate counsel's performance is ineffective is
judged by the same standard that applies to judging the ineffectiveness of trial counsel. See
Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (M[T]he proper standard for evaluating [petitioner's]
claim that appellate counsel was ineffective in neglecting to file a merits brief is that enunciated
in Strickland v. Washington:1). See also Bruner v. Carver, 920 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Utah 1996)
("The standard forjudging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is the same as the standard
forjudging ineffective assistance of trial counsel"). This standard requires Petitioner to "first

1

This showing is greater than simply demonstrating "that the errors had some conceivable effect on the
outcome of the proceeding," but less than demonstrating "that counsel's deficient conduct more likely
than not altered the outcome in the case." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984).
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show that his counsel was objectively unreasonable in failing to find arguable issues to appealthat is, that counsel unreasonably failed to discover nonfrivolous issues and to file a merits brief
raising them." Robbins, 528 U.S. at 285. If Petitioner "succeeds in such a showing, he then has
the burden of demonstrating prejudice. That is, he must show a reasonable probability that, but
for his counsel's unreasonable failure to file a merits brief, he would have prevailed on his
appeal." Id.
In considering the issue of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in the context of a
post-conviction petition, the Utah Supreme Court, in Carter I, cited to a Tenth Circuit case which
held that
[w]hen a .. . petitioner alleges that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
an issue on appeal, we examine the merits of the omitted issue. Failure to raise an
issue that is without merit "does not constitute constitutionally ineffective
assistance of counsel" because the Sixth Amendment does not require an attorney
to raise every nonfrivolous issue on appeal. Thus, counsel frequently will
"winnow out" weaker claims in order to focus effectively on those more likely to
prevail. However, an "appellate advocate may deliver deficient performance and
prejudice a defendant by omitting a 'dead-bang winner,' even though counsel may
have presented strong but unsuccessful claims on appeal."
Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508, 1515 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d
388, 393, 395 (10th Cir. 1995)). See also Carter I, 2001 UT 96 at ^[48.
The Tenth Circuit initially defined a claim as a "dead-bang winner" if it "was obvious
from the trial record . . . and . . . would have resulted in a reversal on appeal." Cook, 45 F.3d at
395 (emphasis added). According to the court in Cook, "[b]y omitting an issue under these
circumstances, counsel's performance is objectively unreasonable because the omitted issue is
obvious from the trial record. Additionally, the omission prejudices the defendant because had
counsel raised the issue, the defendant would have obtained a reversal on appeal." Id. The Utah
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Supreme Court, however, did not adopt this language. Rather, the Carter I Court adopted
language from the Banks decision which defined "dead-bang winner" "as an 'issue which is
obvious from the trial record and one which probably would have resulted in reversal on
appeal.'" Carter I, 2001 UT 96 at Tf48 (emphasis added) (quoting Banks, 54 F.3d at 1515 n.13).
The fact that the Carter 1Court adopted the "probably would have resulted" language instead of
the "would have resulted" language is important because the "probably would have resulted"
language is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's holding noted above that it is the
Strickland standard that applies to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See
Robbins, 528 U.S. at 285. Indeed, in a recent decision the Tenth Circuit held that
[t]o the extent [the "dead-bang winner"] language can be read as requiring the
defendant to establish that the omitted claim would have resulted in his obtaining
relief on appeal, rather than there being only a reasonable probability the omitted
claim would have resulted in relief, this language conflicts with Strickland, The
en banc court, therefore, expressly disavows the use of the "dead-bang winner"
language to imply requiring a showing more onerous than a reasonable probability
that the omitted claim would have resulted in a reversal on appeal.
Neillv. Gibson, 278 F.3d 1044, 1057 n.5 (10th Cir. 2001).
The standard forjudging the effectiveness of appellate counsel embodied in the phrase
"dead-bang winner" is identical to the standard enunciated in Strickland. Therefore, in order for
a petitioner to avoid summary judgment on any claims that allege ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel, he must demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect
to each prong of the "dead-bang winner" standard: (1) that appellate counsel failed to raise an
issue which was obvious from the trial record and (2) that the issue is one which probably would
have resulted in reversal on appeal.
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ANALYSIS AND RULING2
I. Claims Previously Raised and Rejected on Direct Appeal.
All of the following claims were raised and rejected on direct appeal:
1) Claims 4, 14, and 18 (partial) addressing the issue of burden-shifting at the penalty
phase, see Lafferty II, 2001 UT 19 at 1ffll27-28;
2) Claim 7 challenging the removal of juror 220, see id. at f1(58-64;
3) Claim 8 challenging the trial court's decision to admit the crime scene videotape, see
id. at 1H79-84;
4) Claim 9 challenging the trial court's decision to admit the videotape of Petitioner's
media interview, see id. at ^[98-107;
5) Claim 10 challenging the trial court's decision to deny Petitioner's proposed mercy
and sympathy instruction, see id. at ^fl08-112;
6) Claim 21 addressing the double jeopardy issue, see id. at ^[142-149;
7) Claim 32 (partial) addressing the issue of prosecutorial discretion in charging capital
murder, see id. at ^[140-41;
8) Claim 43 challenging the trial court's finding that Petitioner was competent to proceed
to trial, see id. at ^[45-51; and
9) Claim 45 challenging the trial court's denial of Petitioner's motion for a new trial, see

2

Throughout his second amended petition, Petitioner refers to both state and federal constitutional
provisions in asserting his claims. During oral argument, he specifically requested that the court provide
an independent analysis of his claims under both state and federal law. However, Petitioner does not
proffer any explanation as to how the court's analysis under the federal constitution should differ under
the state constitution. Therefore, consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's approach, this court will not
"embark on an independent analysis under the Utah Constitution when the parties had neither argued for
nor briefed a separate analysis." State v Trane, 2002 UT 97,1J21, 57 P 3d 1052.
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id. at TfH52-57.
Unless "there has been an intervening change of controlling authority,.. . new evidence
has become available, o r . . . [the Utah Supreme Court's] prior decision was clearly erroneous
and would work a manifest injustice," Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah, 2001 UT 75, f 10,
31 P.3d 543, "when a legal 'decision [is] made on an issue during one stage of a case,5 that
decision cis binding in successive stages of the same litigation.'" Jensen v. IHC Hosps, Inc.,
2003 UT 51,1[67, 82 P.3d 1076 (quoting Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037
(Utah 1995). See also AMS Salt Indus, v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 942 P.2d 315, 319 (Utah
1997) ("One branch of the doctrine stands for the general rule that 'one district court judge
cannot overrule another district court judge of equal authority.'" (quoting Mas caro v. Davis, 741
P.2d 938, 946 (Utah 1987)). Petitioner has not demonstrated that any of the foregoing exceptions
apply in this case.
Because the foregoing claims raised by Petitioner duplicate claims that were raised and
rejected on direct appeal,3 it follows that these claims are procedurally barred pursuant to Section
78-35a-106(l)(b). Respondent is entitled to summary judgment dismissing these claims.
II. Claims That Could Have Been Raised on Direct Appeal But Were Not.
With respect to all of the following claims, sufficient facts were available to Petitioner at
the time of his direct appeal that he could have raised these claims before the Utah Supreme

3

Respondent also argues that claim 23, addressing the issue of trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failure
to hire a mitigation expert, claim 38, which asserts that Utah's death penalty scheme is unconstitutional
because it creates a presumption of death, and claim 41, which asserts that the death penalty as applied to
Petitioner is unconstitutional because it violates human dignity and serves no penological interest, also
were raised on direct appeal and rejected and thus are procedurally barred. However, it does not appear
to the court that the issues raised m these claims were specifically presented on appeal. They therefore
are not procedurally barred on the grounds Respondent asserts.
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Court, but he chose not to do so:
1) Claim 1 challenging the constitutionality of certain parts of the Utah capital
sentencing statute;
2) Claims 2, 3, 15, 16, 18 (partial), and 19 challenging the penalty phase instructions and
verdict forms;
3) Claim 5 challenging the process of death qualification during jury selection;
4) Claim 6 challenging the trial court's denial of Petitioner's motion for change of venue;
5) Claim 11 (partial) challenging the trial court's decision preventing Petitioner from
admitting a number of mitigating circumstances at the penalty phase;
6) Claim 12 (partial) challenging the trial court's decision not to sequester the jury;
7) Claim 13 challenging the reasonable doubt instruction given at both the guilt and
penalty phases of the trial;
8) Claim 17 asserting that insufficient evidence was presented at the penalty phase to
support the aggravating circumstance that the homicide was committed in an especially heinous,
atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner;
9) Claim 18 (partial) asserting that jurors were naturally disposed to imposing a death
sentence at the penalty phase because they had already found the existence of at least one
aggravating factor at the guilt phase;
10) Claim 20 (partial) addressing the issue that, after the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
vacated Petitioner's conviction and sentence, he was not arrested on a warrant, but simply
transferred from the Utah State Prison to the Utah County Jail;
11) Claim 30 asserting that Petitioner's constitutional rights were violated when the
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prosecution argued that Petitioner murdered one and perhaps both of the homicide victims after
already having argued at Petitioner's co-defendant's trial that the co-defendant had committed
both murders;
12) Claims 32 (partial) and 47 challenging the constitutionality of Section 76-5-202;
13) Claims 33, 35, 37, and 38 challenging the constitutionality of Utah's death penalty
scheme;
14) Claims 34 and 41 challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty;
15) Claim 42 asserting that the cumulative effect of the numerous errors committed
during Petitioner's trial violated his rights to due process and a fair trial; and
16) Claim 46 challenging the constitutionality of Utah's insanity defense statute and
asserting that the trial court improperly relied on the 1995 version of the statute rather than the
1984 version, which was in effect at the time the homicides were committed.
Petitioner argues in his opposition memorandum that the foregoing claims were not
raised on appeal because appellate counsel was ineffective. Indeed, according to Petitioner, the
fact that these claims were not raised is clear evidence that appellate counsel was not performing
effectively. Therefore, Petitioner argues, these claims are not procedurally barred and should be
considered by the court.
In my view, however, claiming that the foregoing issues were not raised on appeal
because appellate counsel was ineffective amounts to a new claim that was not previously raised
in Petitioner's second amended petition, and raising new claims in a memorandum opposing
summary judgment is improper. See Holmes Development, LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, ^[31, 48
P.3d 895 ("A plaintiff cannot amend the complaint by raising novel claims or theories of
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recovery in a memorandum in opposition to a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment
because such amendment fails to satisfy Utah's pleading requirements."). Nevertheless, even if
the court did not view the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim as a new postconviction claim, Petitioner still is not entitled to the relief he seeks. In order to avoid summary
judgment with respect to whether appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise these
claims, he must show that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether
appellate counsel failed to raise an issue which was obvious from the trial record and which
probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal. See Carter I, 2001 UT 96 at f48.
Petitioner has not alleged any facts in support of his ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel claim other than simply to state that the failure to raise these claims on appeal
demonstrates that appellate counsel was ineffective. However, merely raising these claims in his
petition without an adequate factual record to support them does not demonstrate that these
issues were obvious from the trial record and probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal.
That is the burden which Petitioner must meet but which he failed to meet.
From my view of the record, sufficient facts were available to Petitioner at the time of his
direct appeal that he could have raised all of the foregoing claims before the Utah Supreme
Court. Apparently he chose not to do so. Moreover, Petitioner alleges no facts demonstrating
that the failure to raise these claims was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. It follows
that these claims are procedurally barred pursuant to Section 78-35a-106(l)(c) and Section 7835a-106(2). Respondent, therefore, is entitled to summary judgment dismissing these claims.
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III. Claims for Which Respondent Has Requested Summary Judgment and No Objection
Was Raised in Petitioner's Opposition Memorandum.
Petitioner did not respond to Respondent's request that the court grant summary judgment
on each of the following claims raised in the second amended petition:
1) Claim 28 asserting that appellate counsel was ineffective because he failed to appeal
the trial court's denial of Petitioner's request to argue as a mitigating circumstance the fact that
his co-defendant only received a sentence of life in prison; and
2) Claim 31 asserting that Petitioner's constitutional rights are being violated because his
post-conviction counsel do not satisfy the American Bar Association Guidelines (ABA
Guidelines) for attorneys representing capital post-conviction petitioners.
Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires a petitioner to set forth "in plain
and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the petitioner's claim to relief." Utah R.
Civ. P. 65C(c)(3). Moreover, "the petitioner shall [also] attach to the petition . . . affidavits,
copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations." Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(d)(l).
Even a generous reading of the foregoing claims set forth in Petitioner's second amended petition
cannot overcome his failure to provide sufficient facts which, if proven and believed, would
warrant a grant of relief on these post-conviction claims. Indeed, it was for this reason that
Respondent filed its motion for summary judgment.
By not opposing Respondent's request for summary judgment or attempting in any way to
cure the pleading deficiencies related to these claims, Petitioner has failed to show that any
genuine issue exists with respect to the issues they raise. Respondent therefore is entitled to
summary judgment dismissing claims 28 and 31.

16

IV. Newly Discovered Evidence Claim.
Petitioner's initial claim for relief is based upon his assertion that he has new evidence of
perjury or inconsistent testimony by Dr. Stephen Golding, one of the forensic psychologists that
evaluated Petitioner as part of the competency determination. During the competency hearings,
Dr. Golding apparently testified that Petitioner could be found "situationally competent," that is,
competent in some situations, but not competent in others. However, Petitioner contends that
during the recent competency hearings held in the case of State v. Brian Mitchell, case no.
031901884 (3rd District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah), Dr. Golding took a position
contrary to his testimony in Petitioner's competency proceedings, specifically stating that
situational competence is not a valid diagnosis or theory.
It is absolutely clear that neither Petitioner nor his counsel could have known about the
evidence of Dr. Golding's claimed change of heart concerning situational competence at the time
of Petitioner's trial and sentencing or discovered it through the exercise of reasonable diligence
as it first occurred in the relatively recent Mitchell proceedings. However, whether Dr. Golding
in fact subsequently took a contradictory position from that which he took during Petitioner's
competency proceedings, and therefore, whether newly discovered evidence actually exists, is
impossible for the court to judge because Petitioner has failed to provide the court with
transcripts of Dr. Golding's testimony, either from Petitioner's competency hearings or the
competency hearings in the Mitchell case. Furthermore, even assuming that Dr. Golding actually
made contradictory statements concerning "situational competence," Petitioner never expressly
states for what purpose he would use this newly discovered evidence. Indeed, based upon the
information Petitioner does provide, the court can apprehend no purpose for its use other than as
17

impeachment evidence against Dr. Golding.
However, because Petitioner cannot prevail on this post-conviction proceeding unless the
newly discovered evidence is more than merely impeachment evidence,4 see Utah Code Ann. §
78-35a-104(e)(iii), Petitioner's claim fails as a matter of law. Respondent is entitled to summary
judgment dismissing this claim.
V. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Claims.
1. Claim 12 (Partial).
In claim 12 (partial), Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he
failed to request that the jury be sequestered. In support of this claim Petitioner alleges that
during trial one of the jurors spoke with fellow church members about the case and indicated that
he was having trouble with the decisions he had to make. He was given a "blessing" and
apparently told that Petitioner was evil and that he should not be deceived by Petitioner.
Following this event, Petitioner asserts that "the juror felt compelled that he should go forward
and quietly find the Petitioner guilty and sentence him to death." Second Am. Pet. at 10.
However, the juror subsequently revealed his discussions with church members to counsel and
the trial court and the juror was removed from the jury panel. At its heart, Petitioner's argument

4

The court is aware that the Utah Supreme Court has recently stated, albeit as dictum, "that newly
discovered impeachment evidence can justify the granting of a new trial m certain situations." State v
Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ^[66 n.l 1 (2005) (emphasis added). However, at the same time the Supreme Court
declined "to address the issue of whether the Post-Conviction Remedies Act's disallowance of postconviction relief on the basis of newly discovered impeachment evidence is consistent with our case law
predating that act and what effect, if any, such an inconsistency may have." Id. In any event, the use of
Petitioner's alleged newly discovered evidence as impeachment evidence is not, m my view, the type of
impeachment evidence that would justify the granting of a new trial as Dr. Golding was only one of a
number of mental health evaluators who testified about Petitioner's mental condition and it appears that
he was an important, but not a key witness. However, without a transcript of the hearing it is impossible
to fully evaluate the extent of his importance.
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is that because trial counsel failed to request that the jury be sequestered, Petitioner was denied
his constitutional right to the jury that had been selected and thereby lost "the advantage of
perhaps one juror who would have voted for life without parole, thereby sparing the Petitioner's
life." Id
In response to this claim, Respondent correctly argues that Petitioner is constitutionally
entitled to have a fair and impartial jury hear his case and decide his punishment. See State v.
Wach, 2001 UT 35, 136, 24 P.3d 948 ("Both the United States Constitution and the Utah
Constitution guarantee an accused the right to a fair and impartial jury."). However, Respondent
also correctly argues that Petitioner is "not entitled to a jury of any particular composition."
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975). See also State v. Chatwin, 2002 UT App 363,
1fl9, 58 P.3d 867 (M[T]he Constitution does not guarantee either the State or a defendant a jury
comprised of any specific gender balance or composition."); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 575
(Utah 1987) (same).
In this case Petitioner does not argue that he was denied an impartial jury, only that he
was deprived of one of the originally impaneled jurors, one who may potentially have been a
more sympathetic juror.5 He has not shown, however, that the jury that deliberated his fate was
not impartial. The constitution requires no more. Petitioner has not shown that there is any
genuine issue with respect to whether trial counsel's performance fell "outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Respondent is entitled to
summary judgment dismissing claim 12 (partial).

5

It seems clear to this court that had the juror at issue been retained on the jury and the death penalty
still imposed, given the facts asserted m the Second Amended Petition, Petitioner likely today would be
arguing that retention of that juror was improper.
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2. Claim 20 (Partial).
In claim 20 (partial), Petitioner argues that his federal habeas corpus counsel was
ineffective because, after the Tenth Circuit vacated Petitioner's conviction and sentence, counsel
failed to file the Order of Release he had prepared, thereby resulting in Petitioner being
transferred from the Utah State Prison to the Utah County Jail without being arrested on a
warrant. Petitioner contends that this failure resulted in an unconstitutional seizure which has
continued to the present day. Respondent argues that to the extent Petitioner is claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel, his claim necessarily fails because he is not constitutionally
entitled to the effective assistance of federal habeas corpus counsel. Moreover, the Tenth Circuit
indicated that Respondent was free to retry Petitioner and, when Respondent chose that option,
Petitioner was not entitled to release from custody.
As Respondent correctly argues, there is no federal constitutional right to habeas corpus
counsel. See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488 (1969) ("It has not been held that there is any
general obligation of the courts, state or federal, to appoint counsel for prisoners who indicate,
without more, that they wish to seek post-conviction relief"). Moreover, because "ineffective
assistance of counsel claims spring from the right to counsel contained in the sixth amendment, it
follows that there is no constitutional underpinning for the claimed right to effective assistance
[of] . . . habeas [corpus counsel]." Blair v. Arrnontrout, 916 F.2d 1310, 1332 (8th Cir. 1990).
See also Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982) (where there is no constitutional
right to counsel, there can be no deprivation of effective assistance). Therefore, Petitioner cannot
show that any genuine issue exists with respect to whether his federal habeas corpus counsel was
ineffective in not filing the Order of Release that had been prepared. Respondent is entitled to
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summary judgment dismissing claim 20 (partial).
3. Claim 22.
In claim 22, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to
hire effective investigators to interview witnesses and to discover whether evidence had been
tampered with or whether exculpatory evidence existed that would have been helpful to
Petitioner. Respondent argues that Petitioner has failed to identify (1) any facts suggesting the
possibility of evidence tampering; (2) any facts trial counsel had a constitutional duty to discover;
or (3) any facts that would have made a more favorable outcome at either phase of the trial
reasonably likely.
There is no question that trial counsel bears the responsibility of conducting a "substantial
investigation into each of the plausible lines of defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 681.
Nevertheless, in order to avoid summary judgment, Petitioner must do more than simply "rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response .. . must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). Indeed, Rule 65C
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires Petitioner to set forth "in plain and concise terms,
all of the facts that form the basis of [his] claim to relief." Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(c)(3)(emphasis
added). This includes "attaching] to the petition . . . affidavits, copies of records and other
evidence in support of the allegations." Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(d)(l). However, as repeatedly
pointed out by Respondent, Petitioner's pleadings merely assert, without any factual support
whatsoever, that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to adequately investigate the case.
Petitioner has failed to set forth any facts he contends should have alerted trial counsel that
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additional investigation was warranted or any facts which a more extended investigation would
have uncovered. Without these facts, Petitioner cannot show that there is any genuine issue with
respect to whether trial counsel performed deficiently or, even if he did, that the deficient
performance was prejudicial. Respondent is entitled to summary judgment dismissing claim 22.
4. Claim 23.
In claim 23, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to
hire a mitigation expert to ascertain and develop mitigating evidence. Respondent argues that
Petitioner has failed to "allege[] specific facts about how the failure affected him other than to
point out that his brother Dan received a life sentence." Resp't Mem. in Supp. at 10.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that, although "[djefense attorneys need not present all
evidence uncovered by a mitigation workup, . .. they absolutely must perform one." State v.
Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 687-88 (Utah 1997). In conducting a mitigation workup, trial "counsel has
a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular
investigations unnecessary." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. However, the Strickland court has
clearly held that there is no "checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance .. . [and]
[n]o particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the
variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding
how best to represent a criminal defendant." Id. at 688-89. Indeed, the adoption of hard and fast
rules that a defense attorney must follow in order to effectively represent a capital defendant
"would interfere with the 'constitutionally protected independence of counsel' at the heart of
Strickland.1' Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533 (2003) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
While it may be true that mitigation specialists are often helpful in assisting trial counsel
22

to perform their required mitigation investigation, such specialists are not the only manner in
which a mitigation workup may be accomplished. Because trial counsel is constitutionally
permitted the discretion to perform a mitigation investigation in the manner he believes will best
represent the interests of his client, it follows that counsel also must be allowed the discretion to
determine whether he will retain the services of a mitigation specialist. Because the hiring of a
mitigation specialist is discretionary, in order for Petitioner to avoid summary judgment on his
claim, he must allege specific facts demonstrating that there was a particularized need for a
mitigation specialist such that trial counsel's decision not to hire one constituted deficient
performance and, if so, why counsel's failure was prejudicial. Petitioner has provided the court
with no such facts. Therefore, he has not shown that any genuine issue exists with respect to
whether trial counsel was ineffective in opting not to hire a mitigation specialist. Respondent is
entitled to summary judgment dismissing claim 23.
5. Claims 11 (Partial) and 24.
In claim 11, Petitioner makes the general claim that his trial counsel was ineffective
because he "did not do an appropriate analysis or investigation into mitigating factors." Second
Am. Pet. at 9. More specifically, in claim 24, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was
ineffective because he failed to present the following available mitigating evidence during the
penalty phase of the trial: educational records, mental health records, psychological test results,
National Guard records, Utah County Jail records, and evidence of childhood issues, family
background, physical, verbal, and emotional abuse, and childhood illnesses and injuries that
could have been testified about by family members and that were found in Petitioner's journal
entries. According to Petitioner, had trial counsel discovered and presented these mitigating
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circumstances, the outcome of the penalty phase might have been different. Respondent argues,
on the other hand, that, with the exception of Petitioner's "unremarkable" National Guard
records, trial counsel overlooked no relevant mitigating evidence. As a result, Respondent
contends that Petitioner cannot show that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance with
respect to the investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence.
As previously noted, the Utah Supreme Court has held that trial counsel in a capital case
must perform a mitigation investigation. In conducting a mitigation workup, trial "counsel has a
duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular
investigations unnecessary." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. However, as noted in Wiggins,
"Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence
no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist the defendant at sentencing. Nor does
Strickland require defense counsel to present mitigating evidence at sentencing in every case."
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533. See also Taylor, 947 P.2d at 687 ("Defense attorneys need not present
all evidence uncovered by a mitigation workup."). The standard is simply that "'strategic choices
made after less than complete investigation are reasonable' only to the extent that 'reasonable
professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.'" Id. (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 690-91).
Petitioner fails to provide any convincing argument that trial counsel performed
deficiently in conducting a mitigation workup and presenting mitigating evidence. However, he
has submitted a social history of his life that he contends contains mitigating evidence that could,
and should, have been investigated and presented by trial counsel during the penalty phase of the
trial. As Respondent details, however, with the exception of Petitioner's National Guard records,
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all areas of mitigating evidence Petitioner claims was not investigated or presented, was in fact
laid before the sentencing authority during the guilt or innocence phase of the trial. This
included evidence of childhood issues, physical, verbal, and emotional abuse directed toward
Petitioner by his father, illnesses and injuries suffered by Petitioner, Petitioner's performance in
school, mental health records and psychological test results, entries from Petitioner's journal,
Petitioner's character, Dan Lafferty's influence on Petitioner, and Petitioner's conduct while
incarcerated in the Utah County Jail and the Utah State Prison. See Resp't Mem. in Supp. at 2746.
In addition, Respondent also details the areas of mitigating evidence argued by trial
counsel during the penalty phase. These included Petitioner's lack of a criminal history, that
Petitioner acted under the domination of his brother, Dan, that Petitioner was merely an
accomplice in the homicides and that his participation was relatively minor, that Petitioner
suffered from a mental illness and could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or
conform his conduct to the requirements of law, that Petitioner was influenced by a dysfunctional
family and was terrorized by his father, that Petitioner was remorseful for the murders, that
Petitioner exhibited good behavior while incarcerated, that Dan, not Petitioner, was the actual
murderer, and, finally, that death was not the appropriate punishment for Petitioner based upon
the circumstances of the case. See id. at 46-51. The only conclusion that can be drawn from this
detailed analysis is that Petitioner's proffered social history contains no relevant mitigating
evidence that trial counsel should have investigated and presented, but failed to do so.
Petitioner can only avoid summary judgment on this claim by specifically identifying
some relevant mitigating evidence that trial counsel should have investigated and presented but
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did not. Unfortunately, Petitioner fails to allege any such facts in his opposition memorandum.6
Without these facts, Petitioner has not demonstrated that any genuine issue exists with respect to
whether trial counsel was ineffective in investigating and presenting mitigating evidence.
Petitioner also argued during oral argument that even if most of the mitigating evidence
trial counsel relied upon was presented during the guilt or innocence phase of the trial, counsel
was nevertheless obligated to reintroduce that evidence to the sentencing authority at the penalty
phase. Petitioner contends that counsel's failure to do so constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel. Again, Petitioner has provided no legal authority suggesting that in order for trial
counsel to perform effectively, he must reintroduce at the penalty phase all mitigating evidence
that may have been presented during the guilt or innocence phase. Indeed, Petitioner cannot
point to any legal authority for this position.
As noted previously, the United States Supreme Court has expressly held that no
"checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance .. . [and] [n]o particular set of detailed
rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced
by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal
defendant." Id. at 688-89. Indeed, the adoption of hard and fast rules that a defense attorney
must follow in order to effectively represent a capital defendant "would interfere with the
'constitutionally protected independence of counsel' at the heart of Strickland." Wiggins, 539

6

The court agrees that trial counsel's failure to present Petitioner's National Guard records is
inconsequential and cannot support any finding that trial counsel's performance was deficient or, even if
it was, that Petitioner was prejudiced by this failure. As noted by Respondent, "[e]ven [Petitioner's
current mitigation specialist admits that [Petitioner's 'time spen[t] m the National Guard is rather
unremarkable as part of his social history.'" Resp't Mem. m Supp. at 51 (quoting Pet'r Social History at
13).
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U.S. at 533 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has specifically held that the sentencing authority at
the penalty phase of a capital trial is entitled to consider all of the aggravating and mitigating
evidence presented during the guilt or innocence phase. See Lafferty II, 2001 UT 19 at ^[127
("Additionally, just as aggravating factors from the guilt phase of the trial may be considered at
the penalty phase, so may any mitigating evidence or factors presented in the case-in-chief"). It
follows from this holding that trial counsel does not act deficiently in choosing not to reintroduce
at the penalty phase of a trial all of the mitigating evidence introduced during the guilt or
innocence phase. In addition, it is clear in the present case that trial counsel repeatedly referred
to mitigating evidence presented in the guilt or innocence phase in making his argument against a
death sentence during the penalty phase. This included mitigating evidence related to physical,
verbal, and emotional abuse and illnesses and injuries suffered by Petitioner, Petitioner's
performance in school, his mental health records and psychological test results, entries from
Petitioner's journal, Petitioner's character, his co-defendant's on Petitioner, and Petitioner's
conduct while incarcerated in the Utah County Jail and the Utah State Prison.
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment dismissing claims
11 (partial) and 24.
6. Claim 25.
In claim 25, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because
trial counsel was not qualified under Utah law or the ABA Guidelines to be appointed to
represent a capital defendant. Respondent argues that Petitioner had no constitutional right to
trial counsel who satisfied certain qualifications and, therefore, even if counsel did not satisfy the
27

specific requirements enumerated in Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure or the ABA
Guidelines, this cannot serve as a basis for asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
There is no specific language in the Utah Constitution requiring counsel in capital cases
to satisfy certain qualifications in order to provide effective representation. Rule 8, however,
does specifically state that when an indigent defendant is charged with a capital offense, the trial
court must appoint two or more attorneys to represent the defendant and that the trial court must
make a finding that counsel are "proficient in the trial of capital cases." Utah R. Crim. P. 8(b).
The rule then mandates that in making this finding, the trial court must ensure that the experience
of appointed counsel satisfy certain minimum requirements set forth in subsections (b)(1)
through (b)(4). However, Rule 8 also states that "[mjere noncompliance with this rule or failure
to follow the guidelines set forth in this rule shall not of itself be grounds for establishing that
appointed counsel ineffectively represented the defendant at trial or on appeal." Utah R. Crim. P.
8(f). Thus, neither the language of the Utah Constitution nor the sole fact that an attorney may
not have satisfied the requirements set forth in Rule 8 will support a finding that Petitioner's trial
counsel was ineffective.
The same is also true with respect to the federal constitution. In the same way that
Strickland does not set forth a rigid checklist or set of rules that trial counsel must satisfy in order
to provide effective representation, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89, Strickland also does not
set forth specific qualifications that trial counsel must meet in order to effectively represent a
capital defendant. It is not enough to assert that trial counsel did not meet statutory criteria.
Petitioner must demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective. Petitioner cannot show that any
genuine issue exists with respect to whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because
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he was not "qualified" to represent Petitioner under Utah law or the ABA Guidelines.
Respondent is entitled to summary judgment dismissing claim 25.
7. Claim 26.
In claim 26, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to
object to the prosecutor's statement during closing argument at the penalty phase that the
punishment for a fifteen-month-old girl should be greater than the punishment for the death of an
adult. As a result of this failure, Petitioner argues that when he raised the issue of the
prosecutor's improper statements on appeal, he was required to rely on a more burdensome plain
error analysis. Respondent contends that Petitioner cannot prevail on his claim because the very
factors Petitioner would have been required to prove in order to succeed on his prosecutorial
misconduct claim on appeal were expressly rejected by the Utah Supreme Court.
During closing argument at the penalty phase of Petitioner's trial, the prosecutor
commented to the sentencing authority that
"if you determine that the defendant deserves life without parole before we even
consider [the child victim] lying dead in her crib, before we ever consider that the
second person he killed was a 15-month-old infant, then there's only one
punishment left that is meaningful, and that is death."
Laffertyll, 2001 UT 19 at Tf91. Because trial counsel did not make a contemporaneous objection
to this statement, Petitioner contends that when he raised the issue of prosecutorial misconduct
based upon the prosecutor's statements, he was forced to demonstrate to the Utah Supreme Court
not only that the prosecutor's comments "call[ed] to the attention of the jurors matters they
would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict and . .. [that] the error [was]
substantial and prejudicial such that there [was] a reasonable likelihood that in its absence, there
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would have been a more favorable result," id. at ^J90, but also that the statements were obviously
improper. See State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992) (plain error requires a defendant
to "show that the prosecutor's remarks were obviously improper.").
However, as Respondent has argued, even if trial counsel had made a contemporaneous
objection to the prosecutor's statement, and thus avoided having to demonstrate obvious
impropriety, the Supreme Court specifically held that the statement was neither inflammatory nor
prejudicial. See Lafferty II, 2001 UT 19 at ffi[92-93. Petitioner cannot show that any genuine
issue exists with respect to whether trial counsel was ineffective in not objecting to statements
made by the prosecutor during closing arguments at the penalty phase. Respondent is entitled to
summary judgment dismissing claim 26.
VI. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel Claims.
1. Claim 27,
In claim 27, Petitioner argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective because he failed
to appeal the change of venue issue. A similar claim was raised and rejected in Petitioner's first
direct appeal, Lafferty I9 749 P.2d at 1240, but was not raised after Petitioner's re-trial.
Had the change of venue issue been raised on appeal, the standard of review would have
been abuse of discretion. State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, f38, 28 P.3d 1278. See also State v.
Stubbs, 2005 UT 65, f 13, 535 Utah Adv. Rep. 47. In determining whether an abuse of discretion
has occurred, the Utah Supreme Court distinguishes situations where a jury has already reached a
verdict and those where the jury has not yet been impaneled. Here, where the jury had already
reached a verdict before appeal, the Supreme Court would have "examine[d] whether defendant
was ultimately tried by a fair and impartial jury." Id. (citing Lafferty J, 749 P.2d at 1240).
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Contrary to Petitioner's argument, the standard set forth in State v. James, 161 P.2d 549 (Utah
1989) is not the proper standard, although the factors listed may be useful in assessing whether a
defendant has been tried by a fair and impartial jury. See Stubbs, 2005 UT 65 at ^[17 ("[T]he
evaluative criteria established in James can, and often should, play a role in assessing the
ultimate question asked by Widdison: whether the defendant in fact was tried by a fair and
impartial jury.").7
Here, I am unaware of any disputed material facts sufficient to overcome summary
judgment on the issue of appellate counsel's claimed ineffectiveness in omitting the venue issue.
In order to avoid summary judgment, Petitioner has the burden of pointing to genuine issues of
material fact showing that the venue issue was a "dead-bang winner," or more specifically, that
the venue issue was (1) obvious from the trial record and (2) probably would have resulted in
reversal on appeal. However counsel has not pointed to any specific evidence showing that any
juror was biased. Petitioner therefore does not meet his burden and Respondent is entitled to
summary judgment dismissing claim 27.
2. Claim 29.
In claim 29, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
because counsel was not qualified to handle a death penalty appeal under the then-existing Utah
rules of criminal procedure or the ABA Guidelines. Respondent argues that Petitioner had no
constitutional right to trial counsel who satisfied certain qualifications and, therefore, even if

7

State v. James focuses on the community attitudes concerning the alleged offense and articulates four
factors that may be relevant, namely (1) the standing of the victim and the accused in the community, (2)
the size of the community, (3) the nature and gravity of the offense, and (4) the nature and extent of
publicity, but these factors are not controlling. See State v James, 767 P 2d 549, 552 (Utah 1989).
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counsel did not satisfy specific qualifications enumerated in Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure or the ABA Guidelines this cannot serve as a basis for asserting an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.
This is a corollary claim to claim 25 discussed above with respect to trial counsel. As
noted there, no specific language in the Utah Constitution requires appellate counsel in capital
cases to satisfy certain qualifications in order to provide effective representation. Rule 8
provides that when an indigent defendant has been sentenced to death, the trial court must
appoint one or more attorneys to represent the defendant on appeal and that the trial court must
make a finding that counsel is "proficient in the appeal of capital cases." Utah R. Crim. P. 8(d).
The rule then mandates that in making this finding, the trial court must ensure that the experience
of appointed counsel satisfy certain minimum requirements set forth in subsections (d)(1) and
(d)(2). However, Rule 8 also states that "[m]ere noncompliance with this rule or failure to follow
the guidelines set forth in this rule shall not of itself be grounds for establishing that appointed
counsel ineffectively represented the defendant at trial or on appeal." Utah R. Crim. P. 8(f).
Thus, neither the language of the Utah Constitution nor the sole fact that an attorney may not
have satisfied the requirements set forth in Rule 8 will support a finding that Petitioner's
appellate counsel was ineffective because he did not satisfy certain qualifications set forth in
Utah law.
The same is also true with respect to the federal constitution. Because the "standard for
judging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is the same as the standard forjudging
ineffective assistance of trial counsel," Bruner, 920 P.2d at 1157; in the same way that Strickland
does not set forth a rigid checklist or set of rules that counsel must satisfy in order to provide
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effective representation, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89, Strickland also does not set forth
specific qualifications that counsel must meet in order to effectively represent a capital defendant
on appeal. Petitioner cannot show that any genuine issue exists with respect to whether appellate
counsel provided ineffective assistance because he was not "qualified" to represent Petitioner on
appeal under Utah law or the ABA Guidelines. Respondent is entitled to summary judgment
dismissing claim 29.
VII. Claims Related to the Constitutionality of Utah's Death Penalty Scheme.
1. Claim 36.
In claim 36, Petitioner argues that as a result of Utah's death penalty scheme, his
punishment has been cruel and unusual in violation of his constitutional rights because he has
been on death row for approximately 20 years with limited access to prison programs, health
care, and interaction with others. Respondent argues that the PCRA only "permits postconviction relief for constitutional defects in how a conviction is obtained or a sentence is
imposed." Resp't Mem. in Supp. at 57. Because Petitioner's complaint about his conditions of
incarceration have no bearing whatsoever on how his conviction was obtained or how his
sentence was imposed, his claim fails as a matter of law.
As argued by Respondent, the PCRA specifically sets forth the exclusive grounds for
relief that a post-conviction petitioner may rely upon in raising a claim related to his sentence.
These are that "the sentence was imposed in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah
Constitution . . . ; the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner . . . ; the petitioner had
ineffective assistance of counsel. . .; or .. . newly discovered material evidence exists that
requires the court to vacate the . . . sentence." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(l)(a), (d)-(e). In his
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claim, Petitioner is only challenging his sentence of death to the extent that it has resulted, in his
view, in certain untoward consequences for him while waiting to be executed, namely, that life
on death row limits his access to prison programs, health care, and interaction with others. Thus,
Petitioner is basically arguing that but for his sentence of death, he would not be on death row
where, he contends, his conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment. In
challenging his sentence, Petitioner has raised none of the foregoing grounds for relief required
by the PCRA. His claim necessarily fails as a matter of law and Respondent is entitled to
summary judgment dismissing claim 36.
2. Claim 39.
In claim 39, Petitioner argues that death by firing squad constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. This is borne out, he argues, by recent legislation in Utah abolishing death by firing
squad and mandating lethal intravenous injection as the sole method of execution. See Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18-5.5. Respondent contends that at the time Petitioner was sentenced to death,
death by firing squad was permitted but only if that method of execution was selected by the
defendant. Because, pursuant to United States Supreme Court precedent, a defendant cannot
select a method of execution and then challenge its constitutionality, Petitioner's claim fails as a
matter of law. Petitioner responds that at the time he was sentenced to death, he was being
represented by ineffective counsel and he was not competent. As a result, Petitioner contends
that his selection of death by firing squad could not have been made knowingly and voluntarily
and, therefore, he is entitled to challenge the constitutionality of death by firing squad.
Petitioner cites to no state or federal case law holding that death by firing squad is
unconstitutional. On the contrary, although of ancient origin, the United States Supreme Court
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held in the case of Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879) that "[cjruel and unusual punishments
are forbidden by the Constitution, b u t . . . the punishment of shooting as a mode of executing the
death penalty for the crime of murder in the first degree is not included in that category, within
the meaning of the eighth amendment." Id. at 134-35. See also Andrews v. Shulsen, 802 F.2d
1256, 1275 n.16 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that death by firing squad does not violate the Eighth
Amendment); Andrews v. Shulsen, 600 F. Supp. 408, 431 (D. Utah 1984) (citing the holding in
Wilkerson that". . . execution by shooting was not cruel and unusual").
Petitioner contends that the recent enactment of Section 77-18-5.5 demonstrates that "the
State's own action through the legislative and executive branch, have indicated that death by
firing squad is cruel and unusual," Second Am. Pet. at 21. Yet nowhere in Section 77-18-5.5 is
death by firing squad expressly declared to be unconstitutional. Moreover, simply because the
new legislation abolishes death by firing squad, this does not warrant the conclusion that this
method of execution was, or currently is, unconstitutional under either the state or federal
constitutions. Indeed, Section 77-18-5.5 implies just the opposite.
The new legislation provides that "[i]f a court holds that execution by lethal injection is
unconstitutional as applied, the method of execution for that defendant shall be a firing squad."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-5.5(4)(b). If Petitioner's argument is correct, then in the event lethal
injection is found to be unconstitutional in a particular case, Section 77-18-5.5 allows the state to
resort to a method of execution that, according to Petitioner, the legislature has impliedly
declared to be cruel and unusual by enacting Section 77-18-5.5. Such an obvious inconsistency
clearly undermines the validity of Petitioner's argument. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458
U.S. 564, 575 (1982) ("It is true that interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd
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results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are
available."). Petitioner has not shown that any genuine issue exists with respect to whether death
by firing squad constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.8 Respondent is entitled to summary
judgment dismissing claim 39.
3. Claim 40.
In claim 40, Petitioner argues that in light of the United States Supreme Court's recent
ruling that mentally retarded defendants cannot be subject to the death penalty, his execution
would constitute cruel and unusual punishment because he has never had the chance to raise the
issue whether he is mentally retarded. Respondent argues that Petitioner has not alleged
sufficient facts demonstrating that he is mentally retarded. Therefore, he cannot prevail on his
claim.
Consistent with the holding of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the Utah Code
exempts from the death penalty any defendant the trial court determines to be mentally retarded.
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-15a-101(l). According to this exemption statute, a defendant is
mentally retarded if:
(1) the defendant has significant subaverage general intellectual
8

In his opposition memorandum in response to Respondent's motion for summary judgment, Petitioner
asserts that at the time he was sentenced to death, he was being represented by ineffective counsel and he
was not competent. He contends, therefore, that his choice to be executed by firing squad was not
knowingly and voluntarily made This, he asserts, allows him to challenge the constitutionality of death
byfiringsquad. The claim that Petitioner's choice to be executed by firing squad was not laiowmgly and
voluntarily made as a result of mental incompetence and ineffective assistance of counsel is, in the
court's view, a new claim that was not previously raised m Petitioners second amended petition.
However, raising new claims m a memorandum opposing summary judgment is improper See Holmes
Development, LLC v Cook, 2002 UT 38,1(31, 48 P 3d 895 ("A plaintiff cannot amend the complaint by
raising novel claims or theories of recovery m a memorandum in opposition to a motion to dismiss or for
summary judgment because such amendment fails to satisfy Utah's pleading requirements."). Therefore,
the court will not consider Petitioner's new claims.
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functioning that results in and exists concurrently with significant deficiencies in
adaptive functioning that exist primarily in the areas of reasoning or impulse
control, or in both of these areas; and
(2) the subaverage general intellectual functioning and the significant
deficiencies in adaptive functioning under Subsection (1) are both manifested
prior to age 22.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15a-102(l)-(2). Petitioner contends that he is mentally retarded, but he
fails to allege sufficient facts demonstrating that he satisfies the foregoing standard for a finding
of mental retardation. Although he does assert that his social history shows that in his life he
"had a diminished capacity to communicate, to make conclusions from his mistakes, to engage in
logical reasoning, [and] to control his impulses," Pet'r Opp. Mem. at 20, these alleged deficits
fail to satisfy the above standard. Moreover, even if these deficits were relevant, Petitioner never
demonstrates how they warrant concluding that his intellectual and adaptive functioning was
subaverage.
Finally, and perhaps most telling, there is no indication from Petitioner that any
subaverage intellectual or adaptive functioning he may have experienced manifested itself prior
to age 22. Indeed, although Petitioner may have endured a traumatic childhood in a
dysfunctional family, his social history clearly indicates that prior to 1963,9 "he was a good and
easy child to raise, suffering from no abnormalities. cHe seemed to progress through the normal
stages of growth and development with no complications.'" Pet'r Social History at 4-5 (quoting
P. Heinbecker's report of 11/28/84). "In 1960, [he] graduated from Payson High School.
According to his school record he received a 3.2 GPA, well above average. . .. Teachers
described him as well-behaved and a well-adjusted young man." Id. at 7. In his formative years,

9

Petitioner was born on November 4, 1941. See Pet'r Social History at 4.
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Petitioner "worked odd jobs commonly available to high school students, including farm work,
gas station attendant, and labor work," id. at 13, and spent two years in the Army National Guard
prior to his honorable discharge. See id. From 1960 to 1962, Petitioner served a two-year LDS
mission to Florida and Georgia and, following his release, he married in 1963. See id. at 7.
Finally, there is no indication from his social history that prior to 1963 Petitioner needed or
received any type of mental health treatment or psychological evaluations. See id. at 14.
Petitioner has failed to allege sufficient facts demonstrating that he could satisfy the statutory
definition of "mentally retarded" for exemption from the death penalty. Thus, he has not shown
that any genuine issue exists with respect to whether his execution would constitute cruel and
unusual punishment on the ground that he never had the chance to raise the issue whether he is
mentally retarded. Respondent is entitled to summary judgment dismissing claim 40.
4. Claim 44.
In claim 44, Petitioner argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel
because his mental health difficulties prevented him from conscientiously waiving trial counsel's
alleged conflict of interest resulting from counsel's prior representation of Petitioner's codefendant, Dan Lafferty. He also contends that the trial court erroneously permitted trial counsel
to represent Petitioner despite the presence of a conflict of interest. Respondent argues that
Petitioner has failed to allege any facts demonstrating that his constitutional right to conflict-free
counsel was violated. That is, Petitioner fails to show that an actual conflict of interest existed
and that the conflict adversely affected trial counsel's performance. Without this showing,
Respondent argues that Petitioner cannot prevail on his claim.
There is no question that Petitioner had a constitutional right to be represented by
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conflict-free counsel during his trial. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981) ("Where a
constitutional right to counsel exists, our Sixth Amendment cases hold that there is a correlative
right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest."). As with any constitutional right, it
is also true that the waiver of trial counsel's conflict must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
See State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 490-491 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("A defendant can generally
waive his or her right to conflict-free counsel. To be valid, such a waiver must be knowing and
intelligent, and made 'only after adequate warning by the [trial] court of the potential hazards
posed by the conflict of interest and of the accused's right to other counsel.'" (quoting United
States v. Rodriguez, 929 F.2d 747, 750 (1st Cir. 1991)).
In making this claim Petitioner essentially alleges that he did not "conscientiously" waive
trial counsel's conflict. Yet, unless Petitioner is able to demonstrate that an actual conflict
existed that prejudiced him, the waiver issue is moot. Thus, in order for Petitioner to avoid
summary judgment on his claim, he must show that a genuine issue exists with respect to
whether he was denied the effective assistance of counsel as a result of trial counsel's alleged
conflict of interest. To do this, Petitioner must plead sufficient facts demonstrating that trial
counsel had an actual conflict of interest and that the conflict adversely affected trial counsel's
performance. See State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40,1J22, 984 P.2d 382.
Petitioner contends that his trial counsel did have an actual conflict of interest during trial
as evidenced by the fact that his counsel previously represented Petitioner's co-defendant, Dan,
on the same criminal allegations that Petitioner was facing. Petitioner argues that this created an
obvious conflict because his interests and Dan's interests on the issue of guilt in committing the
homicides were materially adverse. Thus, according to Petitioner, his trial counsel had an actual
39

conflict in his representation of Petitioner because counsel represented a co-defendant with
contrary interests.
Petitioner, however, fails to refer to any decisions made or trial strategies relied upon by
trial counsel that actually undermined Petitioner's interests in favor of his co-defendant's
interests. Moreover, Dan was tried in 1985 and Petitioner's second trial occurred in 1996.
Merely pointing out that Petitioner's trial counsel also represented his co-defendant on identical
charges of capital homicide in a separate trial that occurred eleven years prior to Petitioner's trial
is insufficient to show that trial counsel was actively representing conflicting interests that
adversely affected counsel's performance during Petitioner's trial. Indeed, the Utah Supreme
Court has suggested that in situations where an attorney is appointed to represent co-defendants
at different times on charges arising from the same criminal episode, no conflict exists, potential
or otherwise, once the charges against one co-defendant are concluded. See Gardner, 888 P.2d at
620.10 Thus, Petitioner cannot avoid summary judgment on his claim because he has failed to
show that any genuine issue exists with respect to whether his trial counsel had an actual conflict
of interest and that the conflict adversely affected counsel's performance. Respondent is entitled
to summary judgment dismissing claim 44.
VIII. Claims Raised in Part Two of Petitioner's Second Amended Petition.
In addition to the 47 claims raised in Part 1 of Petitioner's second amended petition,
Petitioner asked that his counsel attach to his Second Amended Petition a Second Amended Writ

10

Respondent also noted that counsel called Dan Lafferty as a witness, obtained admissions from Dan
that he (Dan) actually committed the murders, and then vigorously argued during closing arguments and
m the penalty phase that Petitioner should not receive a more severe sanction than Dan received, life m
prison with the possibility of parole. This action by trial counsel does not demonstrate an alliance with
his prior client, Dan, but just the opposite.
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of Habeas Corpus Part 2, apparently written by Petitioner himself, in which he raises four claims:
(1) evidence was planted at the trial proceedings by the prosecution; (2) his second trial violated
his protection against double jeopardy; (3) after the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated
Petitioner's first conviction and death sentence, Respondent failed to arrest, re-charge, or
properly arraign him on the current charges; and (4) his counsel erroneously advised him not to
file a 120-day disposition request.
With respect to the first claim of Part 2, although this claim could have been raised on
appeal, Petitioner argues that it is not procedurally barred because he is alleging that appellate
counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the claim. Therefore, pursuant to Section 78-3 5a106(2), this is a viable claim that the court should consider. Respondent counters that summary
judgment should be granted because Petitioner's claim does nothing more than repeat his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim from claim 22.
As noted above, whether an appellate counsel's performance is ineffective is judged by
the same standard that applies to judging the ineffectiveness of trial counsel. See Robbins, 528
U.S. at 285 (u[T]he proper standard for evaluating [petitioner's] claim that appellate counsel was
ineffective in neglecting to file a merits brief is that enunciated in Strickland v. Washington.").
See also Bruner, 920 P.2d at 1157 ("The standard forjudging ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel is the same as the standard forjudging ineffective assistance of trial counsel."), hi order
to avoid summary judgment on the claim that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise
the issue of planted evidence, Petitioner must show that there is a genuine issue of material fact
with respect to whether appellate counsel failed to raise an issue which was obvious from the
trial record and which probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal. See Carter /, 2001
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UT 96 at T|48.
Petitioner has alleged no facts in support of his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
claim other than to state that the failure to raise the claim on appeal itself demonstrates that
appellate counsel was ineffective. Clearly, this is insufficient to show that appellate counsel's
failure to raise Petitioner's claim was obvious from the trial record and probably would have
resulted in reversal on appeal. Therefore, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment
dismissing Petitioner's first claim in Part 2.
Petitioner argues in his second claim that his second trial violated his protection against
double jeopardy. Respondent argues that this claim is procedurally barred because this is a claim
that Petitioner raised on appeal and lost. Pursuant to Section 78-35a-106(l)(b), a post-conviction
petitioner is not entitled to relief on a claim that "was raised or addressed . . . on appeal."
Petitioner raised the double jeopardy issue before the Utah Supreme Court on direct appeal and
the Court rejected Petitioner's claim. See Lafferty II, 2001 UT 19 at ffi[142-149. As a result,
Petitioner's claim is procedurally barred. Therefore, Respondent is entitled to summary
judgment dismissing Petitioner's second claim in Part 2.
Petitioner's third claim is that after the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated
Petitioner's first conviction and death sentence, Respondent failed to arrest, re-charge, or
properly arraign him on the current charges. Respondent contends that summary judgment
should be granted on this claim because no authority exists "requiring] the State to formally
rearrest, recharge, and rearraign a defendant who has been convicted and is in custody, but is
granted a new trial." Resp't Mem. in Reply at 22. Petitioner does not directly address this issue
in his opposition memorandum.
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Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires a petitioner to set forth "in plain
and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the petitioner's claim to relief." Utah R.
Civ. P. 65C(c)(3). Moreover, "the petitioner shall [also] attach to the petition . .. affidavits,
copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations." Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(d)(l).
Petitioner's claim cannot overcome his failure to provide sufficient facts which, if proven and
believed, would warrant a grant of relief on this post-conviction claim. By not opposing
Respondent's request for summary judgment or attempting to cure any pleading deficiencies, the
court finds with respect to this claim that Petitioner has failed to show that any genuine issue
exists with respect to the issue it raises. Respondent is entitled to summary judgment dismissing
Petitioner's third claim in Part 2.
Petitioner argues in his fourth claim that his counsel was ineffective because he
erroneously advised Petitioner not to file a 120-day disposition request. According to Petitioner,
this advice prejudiced him because it "allow[ed] the press to pollute the jury pool with negative
information which led to the fact that [Petitioner] could not get a fair and unbiased jury." Pet.
Opp. Mem. at 22. Respondent argues that counsel's decision was reasonable because it allowed
him time to prepare for both phases of Petitioner's capital trial.
For the reasons set forth by Respondent, and in light of all the circumstances, the court
cannot conclude that counsel's advice fell outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance. Moreover, even if trial counsel's advice did constitute deficient performance,
Petitioner provides no evidence that a biased juror was seated to hear his case and determine his
punishment. Petitioner has failed to show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
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Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Petitioner has not shown that any genuine issue exists with respect
to whether trial counsel was ineffective in advising Petitioner not to file a 120-day disposition
request. Respondent is entitled to summary judgment dismissing Petitioner's fourth claim in Part
2.
CONCLUSION
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Based upon a careful consideration of all the pleadings in
this case, I am of the view that Petitioner has failed to "set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial," Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e), with respect to any of the claims he raises.
Respondent is entitled to summary judgment dismissing each of Petitioner's claims, which
results in a dismissal of Petitioner's Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Respondent's counsel is directed
to prepare an appropriate order.
DATED this 29th day of November, 2005.

BY THE COURT:
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